Intrahousehold resource allocation : an overview by Haddad, Lawrence et al.
W9sI. IS
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1 255
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Summary findings
The  policy  failures  associated  with  inappropriate  The  response  to ttiat question  was that  it  Uvas
acceptance  of unitary  models  of household  behavior  are  worthlwhile  cxamining  houschold  behavior,  hut  few
more  serious  than  those  associated  with  inappropriate  more  definiite answers  have emerged,  for  thrce  reasons
acceptance  of collective  models,  contend  Haddad,  First,  by their  nature,  the results  of gender  and
Hoddinott,  and Alderman.  intrahousehold  analyses  are specifiC to  cultures  and
They  support  this  claim with  illus.rations.  Consider,  difficult  to generalize,  although  thle prccess  of analysis
for  example,  the  effect  of  public  transfers  made  to  can  be generalized.  Second,  there  is a lack of consensuIs
households.  The  unitary  model  predicts  that  the  impact  about  wvhich conceptua.l  model  of the  houschold  to use
of  such transfers  is unaffected  by the  identity  ot the  both  across  and within  social  science  disciplines.  And
recipient  because  all household  resources  are pooled.  third,  the collection  of many  intrahousehold  data  sets i
With  the collective  model  of  the household,  the welfare  not  driven  by policy  qluestions.
effects  of a transfer  may be  quite  different  if the  recipient  The challenge,  the authors  say, is to produce
is a man,  say, rather  than  a woman.  generalizable  results  useful  for  policy  formulation.  In that
Most  of their  arguments  for  the  policy  relevance  of  regard,  it seems desirable  to  apply  a comnmon conceptu
model  choice  are based  on the  fa.lings  of the unitary  approach  to the analysis  of  policy-oriented  case  studies
model  rather  than  on the  strengths  of a particular  from  a regionally  diverse  set of countries.
collective  model.  As a set, collective  models  may  resolve  Hypotheses  about  these  studies  could  be developed
some  of the anomalies  that  have accrued  uLider the  and  tested  with  and  without  the benefit  of
unitarv model,  but  further  work is neccssary  to irnpros'  intrahousL hold information  to  careful.ly mcasure  thc
their  predictive  power.  tradcoffs  hetween  the  additional  project  and  policy
The  authors  admit  to raising  more  questions  than  insights  de.ived  (and mistakes  avoide(d) and the  extra
answers-  which  they  regard  as positive,  considerinig  burdenis of the  analysis itself.
that  a conference  in the  late  I 980s  focused  on whethcr  it
was  even worthwhile  going  inside  the  "black  box'  of the
household.
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The  World  BankMost  development  objectives  focus  on the  well-being  of
individuals. For  example,  policy  targets  are  often  related  to the
percent  of individuals  that  can  read,  are free  from  hunger,  are  In
good health,  can find  gainful  employment,  and  will  avoid  death  from
dLieaso  or  violence.  While  lt is  widely  recognised  that  the  welfare
of  an  individual  is,  in large  part  based  on a  complex  not  of
interpersonal  interactions,  many  development  policies  do  not
acknowledge  theme  economic  and  social  interactions.  The  interactions
can  affect,  and  be  affected  by,  the  creation  (and  dissolution)  of  many
institutional  formst  family,  household,  business,  club,  or  comune,
to  name  a  few.  For  the  first  two  institutions  in  thli  list,  both  the
processes  by  which  resources  are  allocated  among  individuals  and  the
outcomes  of  those  processes  are  commonly  referred  to  as
"intrahousehold  resource  allocation."'
Taking  this  broad  definition,  this  essay  surveys  a  diverse  body
of evidence  on intrahou-shold  resource  allocation  issues. Emphasis  is
placed  on  why and  how  a better  understanding  of intrahousehold
processes  wUil  strengthen  policy  formulation  and implementation,  and
how  that  better  understanding  may  be achieved. The  evidence  suggests
that  under  many different  circumstances,  the  benefits  to policy  of
understandlng  intrahousehold  resource  allocation  may far  outweigh  the
costs  of acquiring  that  understanding. First,  recent  conceptual  and
methodological  developments  in  the fields  of economics  and
anthropology  that  promlse  to accelerate  our ability  to  grasp  the inner
workings  of households  and families  are  discussed. Second,  the  effect
of  an  improved  undorstanding  of  how  resources  are  allocated  within
households  on  policy  impact  is  shown.
The  idea  that  the  household  represents  a  place  of  exchange  and
can  be  thought  of  as a  firm  has  a  long  history  in  economics  (Chayanov2
1986).  owever,  thse  economics  of  the  family  and  household  was fully
brought  into  the  mainstream  by Becker. The  essence  of Becker's
approach  was that,  in accordance  with one  set  of preferences,  the
household  combined  time,  goods  purchased  in the  market,  and  goods
prouuced  at  home  to  produce  cammoditio.  that  generated  utility  for  the
household  (Becker  196F).
Until  reaently,  much  policy  analysis  has  implicitly  concurred
wlth  this  BeckarLan  vliw  that  "the  household"  behaves  as  lf lt  has
one met  of preferences,  represented  by  a  household  ut_llty  function.
In other  words,  the  household  ls  treated  as lf it  were a unltary
entLty. for  a  glven  set  of prlco  and  pooled  nonlabor  Lncoaw,
resources  are  allocated  to  household  members  accordlng  to thelr
abillty  to  translate  those  resources  Lnto  goods  from  whlch  the
household,  ln  accordance  wlth  a comon  sot  of preferences,  derLves
utilLty. For  example,  "the  householdw  may declde  to allocate  more
health  resources  to a  boy than  a  glrl  because,  compared  to the  girl,
the  boy  can  translate  good  health  lnto  more  income  via the  wage
narket.  However,  thli initial  allocation  decision  may  be  relnforced
or  even  reversed,  depending  on  the  comparative  utillty  derived  by  "the
householdo  from  the  good  health  of the  boy and  girl.
However,  a  growing  body  of emplrical  and  theoretLcal  evidence
from  several  dLsciplLnes  suggests  that  the  unitary  view of the
household  is an expedience  that  comes  at consLderable,  and  possibly
avoLdable,  cost.  Alternative  vliws  of the  worktngs  of the  household
are  obtalned  by a heterogenous  group  set  of approaches  called
"collective  models."
The  two  essentlal  commonalLtLes  exhibited  by collective  models
are  fLrst,  that they  allow  different  decisLonmakers  to have  different
preferences,  and second,  that  they  do not  require  any unlque  household
welfare  lndex  to  be interpreted  as a  utillty  functlon.  These  models
thereby  allow  the index  to be dependent  on prico  and incomes,  as  well3
as Otastss.  While  both  unitary  and  collectlve  models  allow  public
pollcy  tV  change  lntrahoucehold  allocatLons  of  a  good,  only  the  lattor
armLts  publlc  pollcy  to  affect  the  rules  of  Lntrahousehold
allocation.
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A strong  feature  of  the  unltary  model ls lts  ability  to explaln
two  aspects  of  household  behavLor:  daclsons  regardlng  the  quantLty  of
goods  consumed  and  the  equl  or  unequal  allocatLon  of  those  goods
amongst  household  members.  The  existence  of  dLfferentLa'4s  across
household  members  Ln,  say,  calorLe  intakes--ven  after  standardisLng
by  activLty  patterns--does  not  necessarlly  invalidate  the  unltary
model.  However,  for  a  number  of  comentators,  it  ls  the  systematic
nature  of  thes  lnequalLtLes  that  has  cast  doubts  upon  the  valLdLty  of
the  unLtary  model  and  has  lead  to  the  search  for  more  realLitLc
alternatlves.  As ?olbre  (1986,  251)  comments:
The suggestLon  that  women and  female  children  wvoluntarily"
relinquLsh  leisure,  educatlon,  and  food  would  bo somewhat  more
persuasive  if  they  were  .n  a  pouLtLon  to  demand  their  falr  shars.  It
is  the juxtapositLon  of  women's  lack  of  economic  power  wlth  the
unequal  allocatlon  of  household  resources  that  lends  the  bargaining
power  approach  much  of  lts  persuasLve  appeal.
Collectlve  models  take  as  glven  tho LndLvLduality  of  household
members. It  Is  Important  to  note,  however,  that  discrAIinaLIon  is
permitted  by  both  modelm  of the  housohold.  Under  elther  model,
discrimination  li  a  preference  for,  say,  glrl  over  boys,  when  there
are  no productLvity  reasons  to favor  either  sext parents  simply
derlve  more  utllity  from  allocatlng  more  resources  to one child  or
another. The  unltary  model  has  parents  ln agreement  on  the nature  of4
the  discrimLnatLon,  but collectlve  models  do not impose  thLs  comon
preforonce  on both  parents.
Figure  1.1  presents  a  dLaqramatLc taxonomy  of economlc  models  of
the  household. 2 Unltary  models  repreuet a  speclal  case  of
cooperatlve  collectlve  models  where  preferences  aze  ldentical  and,  as
a consequence,  resources  are  pooled. Collectlve  models  can  be dlvlded
lnto  cooperatLve  and  noncooperatlve  models. All collectlve  models  are
Pareto  optLmal,  but  only  mom  noncooperative  models  exhiblt  thli
property.
In  the cooperatlve  approach,  indlviduals  have a choice  of
romainLng  single  or of forming  a household. They  choose  the latter
optlon  when the  utlilty  levels  associated  with belng  together  outweigh
the  utliLty  derLved  from  being  single. For  example,  there  may  be
economies  of  scale  associated  with  the  production  of certain  household
goods,  or  there  may  be some  goods  that  can  be produced  and  shared  by
couples  but  not slngle  indivLduals. The  existence  of the household
generates  a  surplus,  which  wlll  be distributed  amongst  the  members;
the rule  governing  this  distributlon  is a central  issue  of the
analysis.
Startlng  from  this common  framework,  two subclasses  of
cooperatlve  models  have  emerged. Models  of the first  category
suppose  only  that household  decLsions  are always  effLcient  in the
(usual)  Parato  sense. In  partlcular,  nothing  is  assumed  a priori
about  the  nature  of the  decision  process,  or,  equlvalently,  about  the
locatlon  of the flnal  outcome  on the  household  Pareto  frontier. This
does not  mean tnat  the rule  of repartitton  governlng  intrahousehold
allocation  is nonessential,  but rather  that  lt has  to be estimated
from  he  dLta rather  than  postulated  a  priori. This  more general
vliwpolnt  is  especially  convenlent  for  assessing  the  relatlve
relevance  of the  competing  frameworks. In  particular,  an impoztant5
finding  in  that  the efficiency  hypothesis  is suffLcient  to generate
strong  testable  restrictir  zL upon  household  behavior  (ChLappori  1992).
Model,  of  the  second  eubclass  impose  more  structure  on  the
household,  by representing  household  decisions  as  the  outcome  of some
bargaining  procs..,  and applying  to this framework  the  tools  of
cooperative  game  theory. Then  the  division  of the  gains  from  marriage
can  be modleled  as  a  function  of each  member's  "fallbacku  or "threat
point"  position,  Ltself  a  function  of  extra-environmental  parameters
such  as  laws  concerning  alimony  and  child  support  and  prohibitionc  on
women working  outside  the  home  (HcUlroy  1990).
The  noncooperative  approach  (Ulph  1988;  Kanbur  1991;  Lundberg  and
Pollack  1992)  relies  on the assumption  that individuals  cannot  enter
into  binding  and enforceable  contracts  with each  other.  Inutead,
individuals,  activns  are  conditional  on the actions  of others. The
conditionality  of action  implies  that  not all  noncooperative  models
are  Pareto  optimal. However,  work  by McElroy  suggests  that  this is
not  as serious  an it  may seem,  because  noncooperative  solutions  can
serve  as threat  points  in cooperative  models. As McElroy (1993)
notes,  separatic.  is  not  a credible  threat  in a cooperative  bargaining
model  in the  context  of small  daily  decisions.
NOW  CAN DEVELOPMENT  POLICY BB  IMPROVED THROUGH  AN UNDERSTANDING  OF
INTRABOU8SEOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESSXS?
Irrespective  of  whichever  model  of the  household  is more
appropriate  in a given  place  and  time,  a  number  of policy  measures  are
likely  to  be  undermined  by  a  failure  to view  the household  and  family
in  a holistic  manner. The importance  of understanding  the  household
economy  in order  to evaluate  social  programs  is illustrated  by
Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1982). They note  that  social  programs  that
"have  been  designed  for  single  objectives  will, in  general.  have6
multiple  consequences  often  unanticipated  by policymakerc (p.  209).
Work along  theas  lines  was formal'zed  by Singh,  Squire,  and  Strauss
(186)  for  agricultural  producer-conium  r households. Singh,  Squire,
and  Strauss  stressed  that  agricultural  policy  offectc  are  properly
assessed  through  a fuller  approciAtLon  of the  household  economy. They
illustrated  the Lmportance  of accountLng  for  the lnterdependence  of
production  and  consumptlon  decolons  taken  by  semliubslstence  farmers.
The  modellng  of demand  and  supply  elasticltles  under  condltlons  of
lnterdependence  and nonlntardependence  can  lead  to  the  generatlon  of
very  dLfferent  elasticities  that  have  obvLous  LmpllcatLons  for  pollcy.
This  model  has  proven  to be a  powerful  policy  tool and  can
readily  be adapted  to ex,  Lain  complex  patterns  of Lntrahousehold
inequality  (Pltt,  Rosenzweig,  and  Hassan  1990).  Is  the LnvestigatLon
of alternatlve  models,  then,  essentLally  a  matter  of academic
intrique,  or does it have  a  bearlng  on publlc  pollcy?
It is  argued  here  that  there  are important  polliy  areas  in  which
the cholce  of model  matters. Speciflcally,  at least  four  types  of
polLcy  fallure  that  will  be preclpltated  by nxgleoct  of intrahousehold
decLsLonmaking  processes  are  identifled. The  fLrst  concerns  the
effect  of public  transfers  made to the  household. The unltary  model
predicts  that the impact  of such  transfers  is unaffected  by the
identlty  of the reclplent  because  all  household  resources  are  pooled.
For  a household  that  behaves  in  a manner  conslstent  wLth a collectlve
model  of the  household,  the  welfare  effects  of a tranafer  way  be quLte
dlfferent  lf the  recipLent  is,  say,  a  man, as opposed  to a  woman.
Second,  at the  project  level,  the unltary  model  implles  that it
does  not  matter  to whom  pollcy  initiatives  are  directed. ThLs
*information  source  independencen  arLies  because  the  unitary  model
assumes  that  not  only is nonlabor  lncome  pooled,  but  so,  too, is
Lnformation. However,  the  assumption  that the  self-declared  head  of
hous*hold  has  detailed  knowledge  of the  activities  of othor  relevant7
household  members  will invariably  lead  to policy  failure,  such  as
(i)  the nonadoptLon  of oartlcula.7  polLcLes;  and (LL)  unlntended  costs
arLiLng  from  pollcles  that  are  adopted. Failure  to  facliltate  the
adoptlon  of now  technology  or of practices  that retard  envLroymental
degradatlon,  or the  adoptlon  of projects  that  have  make  the target
group  worse  off,  exempllfy  faulty  pollcy  assumptLons.
ThLrd,  and  pernaps  the  most important  dra-back  of relylng  on the
unltary  model  for  pollcy  guLdance,  in  that a  number  of potentially
powerful  pollcy  handles  are  dLsabled. Under  the  unltary  model,
pollcymakers  affect  lntrahouseho,d  resource  allocatlon  primarily
through  changes  Ln  prlces. Some  collectlve  approaches  suggost  that
addltlonal  pollcy  handles,  often  wlth  a  very long  reach,  are  avallable
to the  polLcymaker- 3 Examploe  of these  pollcy  handles  include  changes
in  access  to common  property  resources,  credLt,  publlc  works  schemes,
and  a  general  strengthenlng  of legal  and lnstltutlonal  rlghts.
Another  example  of an LmpllcatLon  of knowlng  the  process  of
Lnf-afamLly  allocatlon  can  be found  ln nutrltlon  pollcy. It is  often
observed  that  the educatlon  of a  mother  has  a  strong  influence  on the
nutrltlonal  status  of a chlld,  even  beyond  the  dlrect  impact  on
household  resources. Strauss,  Thomas  and  Henriques  flnd  evidence  that
this is  medlated  through  information  processLng,  implyLng  that
alternative  means  of convoylng  informatlon  - may,  lmproved  nutrltlon
education  - may substLtute  for  schoolLng  for  those  women  who have
missed  an  cpportunlty  for  formal  educatLei. However,  lf a portlon  of
the  observed  impact  of educatlon  li  due  actually  to a shift  ln  the
process  of lnfrafamlly  resource  allocatlon,  the Lmpact  of conveying
speclflc  knowledge  is  overestimated  and  the  impact  of  other  means  of
changLng  relatlve  status  of  household  members  is  underestimated.
Flnally,  the  nature  of  LnteractLons  between  household  members
will  determlne  whether  publlc  transfers  are  mltlgated  or enhanced  by
changes  ln  pxivate  behavior.  Conider  a  hypothetical  family  with8
young  members  residing  in  towns  and  old  members  living  in rural  areas.
Assume  a  tax  is Lntroduced  on the  urban  workers  wlth the  revenues  used
exclusLvely  to subsidize  rural  wage.. Und*T  lntergeneratlonal
altruism  (a  form  of  the  unitary  model),  transters  are  made  by the
altruist  "young"  to  the  old,  and indivldual  consumption  li a functLon
of  total  famlly  lnoom.  Under  a collective  model  wlth  exchange
motLves  (for  example,  remittances  ln  exchangv  for  tending  cattle),
Lndlvldual  consumptlon  ie  a  functlon  of  lndlvldual  lncome.  The
unitary  model  predLits  that  urban-rural  remittances  will  decrease.
Houever,  under  the  collectlve  model,  the  rural  wage  subsidy  r&ises  the
opportunLty  cout  of  the  provLslon  of  the  ln-klnd  services,  and the
urban-to-rural  remittances  mlght  be expected  to  increase.  In  summary,
the  'ixtent  of  crowdlng  out  io determined  by the  nature  of
intrahousehold  LnteractLons.
However,  these  arguments  on  the  lmportance  of  collective  models
ln policy  analysis  do not  lmply  that  the indLscrimLnate  adoptlon  of a
model sLmply  because  lt li a  member  of  the  co'.lectlve  class  li
advocated.  Despite  numerous  rejectLons  of  Income  pooling  and  of  polar
cases  of  altruLim  wlthln  a  family,  to  date,  no  one  model  of  collective
behavior  dominates  the  alternatLves  posed.  In  fact,  most  of  our
arguments  for  the  policy  relevance  of  model  cholce  are  based  on  the
faLlings  of  the  unltary  model  -Ather  than  the  strengths  of  a
particular  collective  model.  Put  another  way,  as  a  set,  collectlve
models  may  resolve  a  number  of  the  anomalles  that  have  accrued  under
the  unltary  model,  but  further  'ork  li necessary  to  lmprove  their
predLctive  power.  This  should  enhance  thelr  usefulness  for  polLcy
purposes.9
2  KOUBUNOLD NODES  AND ZN!RNOUUSUOLD  ItsOURCE  ALOCJAIO
HOUIKHOLDS,  FANLLIZS,  AND  TRH  UNIT  01 0383X^ATION.
Households  are  a  basic  unit  of  interpersonal  intoractLon,
generally  reflecting  both  biological  and  economic  coionalitLes.  For
purposes  of  observation,  say in  a census  or survey,  coresidency  is
often  primary  in  determining  what  interactions  a*e  deemd
it'trahousehold  as  opposed  to other  social  and  comercial  afflilatLons.
Clearly,  this  begs  a  number  of questions.
Residency  is  one  of  a  number  of  aspects  of shared  consumption  for
whlch  one  individual's  consumption  does  not  necessarily  reduce  that
available  for another. Pow consumption  is shared,  and  more important,
wlth  whom it is  shared,  may  be quite  different  than  the sharing  of
other  resources  tst  are influenced  by residency. slmilarly,  the
comonalLties that  promote  sharing  of consumption  may differ  from  the
interactions  that  are  central  to nonmarket-mediated  sharing  of
productive  resources.
Indeed,  for  a number  of purposes,  the functional  household  Ls  not
a coresident  unit.  Nuclear  families  may be spatlally  usparated  due  to
migration,  yet  economically  linked  by remittances. Sinailarly,
families  are  linked  over  goneratLons  by  shared  consumption  and  asset
bequests,  even  thouga  they  may  not  be a  household  by  many  conventional
deflnitions.  M=vover,  polyandrous  and  polygamous  families  are  often
only  partially  overlapping  physical  units.  Thus,  for  many  purposes,
any  study  of intrahousehold  resource  allocation  must  take  the broader
perspective  of intrafamily  resource  allocation.
Nor is it always  sufficient  to focus  on the household,  hnwever
defined,  at a single  point  in  time.  There  are  both policy  and
measurement  issues  that  revolve  around  an understanding  of how10
households  form  and  diusslve. Inheront  in  many of  the  models  of
intrahousehold  allocation  is  an  implicit  contractual  relationship
under  which  a  union  li  formod,  with  attendant  righlts,  obligations,  and
perslties. This  process  reflects  the initial  viewo  and  endowments  of
the  members  of the  household  and  partially  determines  how  theso  will
evolve.
The  basic  economic  model  of household  formation  is due  to Becker
(1973,  1974a). Becker  argues  that  households  are  formed  to (i)
produce  goods  not  available  through  the  market,  children  being  an
example;  and  (ii)  exploit  gains  avaLlable  from  differences  in
individuals'  comparative  advantages  in  the  production  of  certain
goods. Though  som of these  goods  could  be producod  by the  market,
the  ability  of spousoe  to monitor  each  other's  behavior,  and  their
ability  to use  loyalty  to obtain  certain  ends,  minimizes  transaction
costs. These  goods  are  produced  more  efficiently  within  the household
than  outside  it  Ben-Porath  (1979)  and  Pollak  (1985)  discuss  this
further.
Given  the  benefits  of household  formation,  why do they  ever
collapse? Becker,  Landes,  and  Michael  (1977)  argue  that  household
dissolutLon  occurs  as a consequence  of imperfect  information. That
is,  individuals  do not  know  enough  about  their  partner  when  they
marry.  once  united,  partners  discover  the  true  benefits  available  and
these  may  be  lose  than those  perceivod  prior  to household  formation.
Dissolution  ensues.  In the  context  of  marriage  and  dlvorce,  Becker,
Landes,  and  Michael  note that  the link  between  dissolution  and
information  is consistent  with several  stylized  facts: that
individuals  who  marry  at  a  younger  age  are  more likely  to divorce
(because  they  have not  spent  as  much  tlme  searching  for  a  suitable
partner);  that  marriages  tend  to collapse  in  the  early  years  of
marriage;  and  that  the likelihood  of divorce  falls  as  the  length  of11
time  married  Lnereases,  reflecting  the  accumulation  by both parties  of
"marriage-specific  capital*  that  is  of little  value  outside  marriage.
A second economic  approach  to marriage  is  the collective  model.
Individuals  contemplating  household  formation  draw  up a conjugal
contract  specifying  the  division  of marital  gains.  Exogenous  changes
in their  fall-back  positions  make  one  partner  better  off  outside
marriage  and  this  may lead  to divorce  '4
Processeo  of household  formation  and  dissolution  in developing
countries  have  received,  at least  from  economists,  scant  attontion.
This  is  regarded  as  a  serious  shortcoming,  from  both  a  research  and
policy  point  of  view.  For  example,  female-headed  households  are  often
perceived  as a  vulnerable  group,  and  one  to  which  certain  policy
measures  should  be directed.  As indicated  by  Louat,  Grosh,  and  van
der  Gaag  (1993;  tleo  Kennedy  and  Peters  1992)  make clear,  this
approach  is  too  simplistic. Female  headship  is  not  always  a  good
indicator  of povertyl  the  gender  of  the  household  head  may  only  affect
intrahousehold  resource  allocation  for  certain  incom  ranges  and
certain  household  structures. Such findings  beg  the que  tions  what
are  the  processes  by which  households  are  formed  and  dissolved?
Second,  changes  in  marriage  markets-the mechanisms  by which
individuals  find  other  individuals  with  whom  to form  a  household--can,
in the  long  run,  offset  the intanded  impact  of policy  interventions
(Lundberg  and  Pollak  1992;  McElroy,  1993).
MODELS  OF HOUSZEOLD  DECZUIONMAEZNG
The  Unitary  Model
Most  models  for  household-level  analysis  assume  that  the
household  behaves  "as  if"  it  were a  single  entity. A single  welfare
function  represents  the  household's  preforences. All household
resources  (capital,  labor,  land,  and  nonlabor  income)  aro  pooled  and
all  expenditures  are  made out  of pooled  incom.  The focus  here  is  on12
the clams  of  models  that  treat  households  as units  of both  production
and consumpticn. Certainly,  all  households  are  producers  of  so-called
2-goods,  that is,  commodities  produced  by combining  market-purchased
goods  with  labor-child  care is  an example. Of  course,  many
households  are  producers  of  other  goodss  crops  or  livestock  in  the
case  of  rural  households  and  goods  produced  in  owned  business
enterprises  in  both  urban  and  rural  areas. Following  Chiappori  at  al.
(1993),  thiL  in called  the "unitary"  model,  because  this label
descrlbes  how  the  household  acts--as  one.
The basic  unitary  model  is summarized  by Singh,  Squire,  and
Strauss  (1986). Household  welfare  is  defined  over three  goods  an
agricultural  staple,  a  market-produced  good,  and  leisure. This is
maxmiszed  subject  to three  constraints:  a cash  constraint  (the  sum  of
cash  expenditures  euals the  value  of not  sales  less  net input  costs),
a  time  constraint,  and  a  technology  constraint  (that  is,  the  level  of
output  associated  with  different  combinations  of  inputs). Solving
this constrained  maximization  problem  generates,  in  the  first
instance,  the  result  that labor  is  used on the  enterprise  to the point
where its  marginal  return  equals  its  marginal  cost.  Provided  that  own
and  hired  labor  is  homogeneous,  and  that  well-functioning  labor  and
output  markets  exist,  labor  refers  to the amount  of labor  employed;  it
is  not solely  family  labor. Because  the household  does  not  need  to
decide  how  much  labor  it  is supplying,  production  decisions  are
mep  rable  from  consumption  and  labor  decisions. The  value  of full
income  associated  with  profit  maximizing  behavior,  together  with  the
prices  of goods  and  wage rates,  determines  consumption  of  the
agricultural  staple,  the  market-produced  good,  and  leisure.
A critical  feature  of  this  model  is that  it  relies  on  a  number  of
assumptions,  including  homogeneous  labor  and  well-functioning  labor
markets,  in  order  to obtain  separability.  Separabilty  also  may  fail
if  markets  for  credit  and  insurance  are  absent  or if  health  influences13
earnings. If separability  fails  to hold,  incom  as a  regressor  in
equations  that  examine  the  determinants  of the  demand  for  goods,
including  such  goods  as child  health,  cannot  be  included. That is,
the  model  can  not  be trated  as recursive. Instead,  a reduced  form
must be employed  with  only  prices  and assets  appearing  on the  right-
hand side (and,  of course,  even  the  latter  are  endogenous  over  a  long
enough  time horibon).S
As Singh,  Squire,  and  Strauss  (1986)  note,  separability  is a
testable  assumption. The  evidence  to date le  mlxed. Lopes (1986)
rejects  separability,  and  Deolalikar  and  Vijerberg  (1967)  find  that
own and  hired  labor  are  not  perfect  substitutes  in India  and  Malaysia.
Benjamin  (1992),  however,  has  found  support  for separability  in labor
decisions  in  rural  Java.
An attraction  of the unitary  approach  is that  the  list  of
arguments  in the  maximand  can  be extended  to cover  the  demand  for
almost  any  type  of  good  and  also  its  distribution  amongst  household
members  (Pitt  1993).  Indeed,  it  must  be stressed  that  the  unitary
model  is  by  no  means  silent  on issues  of intrahousehold  distribution.
However,  recall  that  this  approach  relies  on  the  critical  assumption
that  there  exists  a  household  welfare  function.  If  individual  members
have  different  preferences,  the  assumption  of a  household  utility
function  requires  that  these  d4ffering  preferences  be  aggregated. To
be truly  comfortable  with conclusions  resulting  from  applications  of
the  unitary  model,  it  would  be reassuring  to know  that such  an
assumption  has a strong  theoretical  basis.
one possibility,  outlined  by Samuelson  (1956),  is  that the
household  welfare  function  reflects  a  consensus  amongst  members.
However,  this does  not indicate  how such  a  consensus  is  reached. A
second  approach  applies  Sen's (1966)  model  of cooperatives  to the
household. Here,  family  welfare  is the  weighted  sum  of the net
utility  of all  members. But  in  the absence  of a  dictator,  or14
syi_etrlc  sympathy,'  lt li  unclear  how  these  weights  are  determined.
They could  be tho  outcome  of a  voting  schme.  Yet  there  are  a wide
range  of  circumstances  under  whlch  thli fails  to  generate  a  unique
ordering  of preferences  (sen  1986). Another  weakness  of thls
justification  li  that the  correspondLng  aggregate  lndex  will not  be
equlvalent  to a welfare  functlon  unless  lt is Lndependent  of  prlces
and Lncome.  Ruling  out  a prlorl  any  effect  of lncomes  upon
intrahousehold  weights  is also  a  very strong  assumptlon.
Another  possibility  ls  that  there  exlits  a  household  dLctator
capable  of LmposLng  hli  or her  preferences  on other  members. However,
such  a dictator  must have  some  means  of enforclng  the preference
orderlng. An Lngenlous  solutlon  to thli  problem  is Decker's  (1974,
1981)  rotten  kld  theorem."
Decker  consLders  the  case  of a  household  wlth  two  members,  a
benefactor  and  a recLpLent. The  benefactor  is an altruist,  deriving
utliLty  not  only from  her own  consumption  (cl),  but  also from  the
utliLty  assoclated  wlth  the recLpLent's  consumptLon. By contrast,  the
recipient  la selfLsh,  derlvlng  utillty  solely  from  hli  own consumptLon
c,). Formally,  thelr  utillty  functLons  can  be written  as:
bonefactor's  utillty: Ub  . TUb(cb,  U,cC,)3,
recipLent's  utillty: U,  - U,c,j.  (1)
Suppose  tho lnltlal  Lncomes  of the  benefactor  and  reclplent  are
gLvenat  a  level  such  that  the  benefactor's  consumptLon  level
associated  wlth  thls Lncom.  is suboptlmal;  as an altruLst,  she  could
be made better-off  by transferring  some  amount  to the recipient,
ralilng  hli  consumptlon. Now  suppose  the recipient  behaves  wrottenly"
-specifically,  he undertakes  some  actlon  that  raLses  hli own incom at
the expense  of the  benefactor. Were the  amount  transferred  by the
benefactor  unchanged,  this  would  make  the recLpLent  better-off.
However,  the  benefactor  maximizes  her  utillty  by maklng  a  much smaller
transfer  to the reclplent,  wlth  the  net  effect  of reducing  the1S
recipients level  of consumptLon  below  his  original  level. Knowing
this,  the  recipient  will  not behave  rottenly  in  the first  place.
This in  an attractive  result. The  rotten  kid  theorem  resolves
the  problms of aggregation  and  enforcement. The  preferences  of the
altruist  becom  the  preferences  of the household;  the household's
iaximand  become  the  utility  function  of the altruist. However,  the
rotten  kid  theorem  only  holds  under  restrLctLve  circumstances.
First,  note  that  the  benefactor  must  be altruistic  over all
levels  of the consumption  of others. Consumption  by others  can  be
nelther  an  inferior  or  luxury  good-otherwise  the  threat  of reduced
transfers  may  not  be  credible  over  all  levels  of consumption.
Moreover,  the  theorem  assumes  that any  attempt  by the  recipient  to
disrupt  the  given  distribution  of consumption  is  smll  relative  to
that  available  to the  altruist. That is,  a kid could  not  be so rotten
that  he reduces  the altruist's  consumption  below  his initial
endowmnt, whlle  raising  his  own  above  it.  previous  (endowment  plus
transfer)  level. Further,  not  only  must  the  resources  of the altruist
be larger  than  any  one lndividual,  they  must also  be larger  than any
coalition  of  household  members. If this  was not  the  case,  it  may  be
possible  for  a  group  of  individuals  to  behave  rottenly,  increasing
their  collective  consumption  at  the  expense  of  others.6
Hirshleifor  (1977)  has  suggested  that  Becker's  result  is
dependent  on who  makes  the last  move.  Specifically,  if  the rotten  kid
can  act  after  the  benefactor  has  transferred  consumption  (as  in ElnM
Lua),  he can  behave  selfishly  without  fear  of retribution.  Bernheim
and Stark  (1988)  and  Bruce  and  Waldman  (1990)  develop  a line  of
criticLem  known  as the  Samaritan's  Dilemma. Assume  there  are  two
household  members  who live  for  two  periods. One is altruistic  while
the  other  is s*lfish. Both consume  a  portion  of their  endowment  in
the  first  period. In the  second  period,  the  altruist  divides  his
remaining  resources  between  himself  and  the  other  person. The selfish16
member  consumes  the  rest  of his endowment  and  the  transfer  from  the
altruist. However,  because  the selfish  agent  known  that  the altruist
will  make a  transfer  to him,  he  consumes  more in the first  period  than
he would  in  the absence  of a transfer. The  altruist  can  only  prevent
such  behavior  by consuming  more  in  the  firut  period  than  he would  do
otherwise.  This  generates  inefficiency  as  the  utility  of  the  altruist
falls  below  that  which  he would  have  obtained  had  the  selfish  member
not  attempted  to free  ride.  Bergstrom  (1989)  generalizes  these
results  and  shows  that  the  rotten  kid  theorem  collapses  when a second
coodity  is introduced. Only  under  the  strong  condition  of
transferable  utility  does it  continue  to  hold.
The  Collective  Anoroach
In  the  absence  of  some  strong  assumptions,  such  as  households
consisting  of  members  with  identical  preferences,  or  the  existence  of
an omnipotent  and  omniscient  household  head,  the  assumption  of  a
household  welfare  function  is  difficult  to maintain. Yet,
alternatives  to this approach  have  not  been  widely  adopted. A major
reason  for  this is  given  by Rosenzweig  and Schultz  (1984,  522):
If the  joint  family  utility  framework  is  to be replaced  by a
less parsimonious  model  of intrafamily  regource  allocation,
the increase  in complexity  should  be explicitly  demonstrated
to have  empirically  distinguishable  predictions.
A broad  class  of alternative  household  models  that do not impose
the assumptions  of the  unitary  model  is  now considered. Following
Chiappori  et al. (1993),  these  are  called  "collective"  models,  to
distinguish  them from  the  unitary  approach  discussed  above. These  do
not  require  any  unique  household  welfare  index  to be interpreted  as a
utility  function. This  allows  the index  to be dependent  on prices  and
incomes,  as well as "tastes"  (Chiappori,  1993).  There  are  two  broad
types  of collective  model:  cooperative  and noncooperative.  The17
unitary  model  can  be  seen as a  special  case  of  thLl  more general  class
of  models.
Noncooperative  Mod-ls.  The noncooperatLve  approach  does  not  asume
that  embers  necessarlly  enter  lnto  blndlng  and  enforceable  contracts
wlth  each  other.  Zxamples  of  thli  approach  lnolude  Louthold  (1968),
Ashworth  and  Ulph  (1981),  Ulph  (1988),  Woolley  (1988),  Xanbur  (1991),
and Carter  and  Katz (1993). The  apprwach  la illustrated  via  a  summary
of Carter  and  Katz.
They assume  that LndLvLduals  wlthln  the  houoehold  not  only  have
dlffering  preferences,  but  act  as  autonomous  subeconamles. Zach
indivLdual  controls  thelr  own  lncome  and  purchases  coomodLtLes  subject
to  an lndlvldual  (nonpooled)  Lncome  constraint.  A not  transfer  of
incom  between  indLvLduals  establlshes  the  only  llnk  between  thm.
Zach  LndLvidual  has  a  utlilty  functlon  conaLstLng  of  a  good  they
excluaLvely  consume  (x,  xg)  and  some  comonly consumed  Z-good  (z),
condltlonal  on  the level  of  net  transfers  (6).  These  are  maximiLed
subject  to three  constraLnts: a  cash  Lncome  constraint,  a 5-good
productlon  function,  and  a  tlme  constraint. Formally,  thls can  be
wrltten  as:-18
Max  U(x,,IsI)  Max  UU(x,aIe)
xf, 1,17  3,
s*t*  s.t.
fxf  S  wPl"7+O  PO  s  w.l -O
. a  a,<1;f +  1. )  z  - .^11  +  .1.)
1;  + 1  S  L,  1  +  1  S  '_),  (2)
where  1',  is  f'c labor  tim  supplied  to z-good  production;  1  is  m'l
labor  time  supplied  to  z-good  production;  10f  is f'*  labor  time
supplied  to  wage  work;  1  ins m's  labor  time  supplied  to wage  work;  PI
and r  are  the  prices  of x3 and  x,  respectlvely;  and  wf  and  w,  are
female  and male  wage  rates  respectively.
In  thLs  noncooperative  setup,  it in assumed that  when  making  her
decisions,  f  takes  Sas  given  and  chooses  xf  in  order  to  maximize  her
own  utility  (Uv)  subject  to the  constraint  that  her  purchases  are  less
than  her  own  income  plus  not  transfers.  This  yields  a  demand  function
for  x,,  whlch  is  a  function  of p',wt  and  S.  A  similar  function  exists
for  x,,  which  is  a  function  of p,w, and  S.  The  Nash  equilibrium
(given  what  m is  doing,  f  cannot  do any  better  and  vice  versa)  is  the
pair of  x,  and  x,  that satisfies  both demand  functions  simultaneously.
An attractive  aspect  of this  approach  is  that it  does not  assume  that
income  is  pooled--a  feature  in agreement  with many  of the  empirical
studies  reviewed  later.
Coooerative  Models.  Broadly  spe  aking,  thore  are  two  types  of
cooperative  approaches.  Models  in the  first  category  only suppose
that  household  decisions  are  always  efficient  in  the (usual)  Pareto
sense  (Appa  1981,  1982;  Apps and  Room 1988;  Kap*eyn  and  Kooreman  1990;
and  Chiappori  1988,  1992,  1993). In  particular,  nothing  is assumed
a priori  about  the  nature  of the  decision  process,  or equivalently,
about  the  location  of the  final  outcome  on the  household  Pareto19
frontier. This  does  not  man  that  the  rule  of patriation  governing
intrahousehold  allocation  is  nonessential,  but rather  that  it has  to
be  estimated  from  the  data  rather  than  postulated  a priori. This
general  approach  is  cp cially  helpful  for  assessing  the relative
merits  of competlng  frameworks. In particular,  an important  finding
is  that  tho  efficiency  hypothesis  is suffLcient  to generate  strong
testable  restrictions  upon household  behavior. 7
Models  of the second  class  impose  more structure  on the  resource
allocation  process. These  models  represent  household  decisions  as the
outcome  of som  bargaining  process,  and  apply  to this framework  the
tools  of  cooperative  game  theory  (Manser  and  Brown  1980;  Mczlroy  and
Horney  1981u  Mczlroy  1990). Mc3lroy  (1993)  provides  a detailed
description  of this approach.
The  cooperative  household  modol  can  be depicted  with two
individuals,  m and  f,  who,  when they live  separately,  have utility
functions  of U,'(xo,  x,,  l1)  and  Us(xa,  xf,  l), respectively. Here,  x,
is a  good consumed  solely  by e, xf  is a  good  solely  consumed  by f, 1,
and lf  are  leisure,  and  xo  is  a  public  good  consumed  both  when
individuals  are  a household  and  when  they are  apart  (household
cleanliness,  for  example). Let  p  be a vector  of the  prices  of all
goods,  w be the  wage rates  of m and f,  and It  and I,  their  respective
nonwage  incomes. If  m and  f live  separately,  their  utility  functions
are  maximized  subject  to a  full  income  conetraint. Their  indirect
utility  functions  can  be written  as  V. 0(po,  p,,  w,,  I,s  a,)  and  Vfo(p 0,
pt,  w,,  It;  at).  The  a's  are  refored  to as extrahousehold  environmental
parameters  (UPs).
Now suppozs  that  these  two individuals  are  considering  forming  a
single  household. We denote  utility  functions  when  married  as U, and
Uf,  respectivoly,  where  U is  defined  over the  household  public  good,
individual  consumption  of goods,  and leisure.$  Both individuals  gain
from  household  formation  when:20
U1- VJ  0  for  j-m,  f.  3)
How  are  theme  gains  apportioned?  One approach  is to assume  that
these  individuals  negotiate  with  each  other. The  outcome  of this  is a
blndlng  and  enforceable  agreement  regardLng  the dLvLsLon  of  gains  from
marriage. One  such  agreement,  whlch  has  recelved  much attentlon,  io
to assum  that  lndlvlduals  agree  to maximize  a  "Nash  utlilty  gain
product  function." Thla  takes  the  form  ofs
N *  (U.  - V.)(Ut  - V,).  (4)
Thli la  maLmLzed  subject  to a  joLnt  full-Lncome  constraint,
namlys
p4  + p,x,  +  pfxf  + wrl  + w,l.  - (w.  + wf)T  I  I  + If  (5)
Thli  yields  the followlng  demand  functLons:
xi  s  (p,  we I,,  If;  a.,  at)  i  - 0,  m,  f
11 - l,(p,  w,  la,  If;  a  at)  i  - m,  f.  (b)
Note  that  ln addltlon  to  prlcea  of  goods  and  leLoure,  these
demand  functlons  Lnclude  nonwage  lncome  and  the  extrahousehold
envlronmental  parameters. As  £Xclroy  (1990)  emphasLzes,  the  unltary
model  is a  speclal  case  of this  Nash  model,  wlth  the parameters  on I1
and  ai  sot  equal  to  zero.  This  is a  teutable  restrLctLon. The  11Ps
are  variables  that  shlft  lndlviduals'  threat  points  (McElroy  1990;
1993).  In  the  context  of  developed  countrLes,  she  suggests  that  theme
would  lnclude  measures  of  the  relevant  marrlage  and remarrlage
markets,  laws  concernlng  alimony  and  chlld  support,  changes  ln  tax
status  assocLated  with  movlng  between  marital  states,  the  ability  of
each  person  to  recelve  assistance  from  his  or  her  own  famLly  (itself
perhaps  a  functlon  of  parental  wealth),  and  prohlbltlons  on  work
outslde  the  home.
Furthgr  Cownents. The:e  are  several  general  features  to  note
regardlng  these  models. FLrst,  it  would  be desLrable  if  the  outcome
by Lntrahousehold  bargaLnLng  were  Pareto  optimal.  ThLs  is  not  a21
problem  for  cooperative  models,  where  given  certain  assumptions,
Pareto  optimality  is obtained.  By contrast,  this  is rarely  the  came
with  noncooperative  models.
second,  recall  that  an appealing  aspect  of Becker  a  approach  is
that  it resolved  the  problem  of  onforcoment;  that is,  how  did  the
household  head  ensure  that  everyone  did  what  he wanted  them  to do?
IHow  do collective  approaches  resolve  this issue? The  threat  of
marital  dissolution  is possible  in  the  context  of long-term  decisions
but,  as  MNclroy 11993)  notes,  wIn  the  context  of small  daily
decisions,  it 14  not  credible  for  either  spouse  to threaten  dLvorce".
She suggests  that decisions  regarding  short-run  issues  can  be
motivated  by  the  anticipated  loss  associated  with delays  in settling
isagreements,  (s-e  the  work  of  Binmore,  Rubinstein,  and  Wolinmky,
1986).  An alternative  solution  is suggested  by  Lundberg  and  Pollak
(1992).  They  develop  a  collective,  cooperative  model  of  household
behavior  with  a  noncooperative  Cournot-Nash  solution  within  marriage
as  the  threat  point.  (That  is,  the  man  and  woman may  start  with  a
cooperative  agreement,  but  if  this  does  not  work,  they  fall  back  on
the  noncooperative  equilibrium.)  Lundberg  and  Pollak  call  this a
separate  cpheres"  equilibrium.  At  this  point,  husbands  and  wives  are
responsible  for  a distinct,  gender-specific  set  of  activities.  As
minimal  coordination  is  required  at  this  threat  point,  "each  spouse
makes  decisions  within  his  or her  own sphere,  optimizing  subject  to
the  constraint  of individual  resources"  (Lundberg  and  Pollak  1992).
Third,  the  vast  majority  of cooperative  models  have  relied  on a
Nash solution;  several  commentators  have  exproesed  concern  over  this
(For  example,  Chiappori  1988b). At one level,  this is  unproblematic.
Binmore,  Rubinstein,  and  Wolinsky  (1986)  show  that  the  Nash
cooperative  solution  is,  under  certain  circumstances,  the limiting
case  of a  noncooperative  game  of altornating  offers. Harsanyi  and
Selten  (1988)  also  argue  that  the  Nash  cooperative  solution  emerges22
from  a  number of noncooperative  frameworks. Yet,  at  another  lsvel,  it
is problematic: the  faLlure  of an  empLrical  model  to differentiate
between  competing  approaches  could  reflect  the  genuine  absence  of a
difference  or merely  the  inappropriateness  of the  bargaining  model
adopted.
Fourth,  these  collective  models  (and  the  policy  implications
derived  from  them)  are  developed  in a  static  context. For  example,
the operations  of the  marr~.age  market  are  aszzmed  to be exogenously
determined. Relaxing  this  assumption  alters  the impact  of policy
changes  on household  behavior. Lundberg  and  Pollak  (1992)  consider
the impact  of  payment  of child  allowances  to  women.  In their  model,
such  a scheme  will  initially  improve  the intrahousehold  distribution
of resources  in favor  of women.  But  suppose  that household  formation
is  preceded  by mome  form  of binding  agreement  (such  as  a prenuptial
contract)  that includes  the  promise  of transfers  from  husband  to wife.
Once  the  new  child  allowance  scheme  is in place,  one  might  expect  that
humbands  reduce  these  transfers. As Lundberg  and  Pollak  note (1992),
With  binding  transfers,  the  distributional  effect  of a  policy
changing  the recipiert  of child allowances  will therefore
persist  only  within  marriages  in  existence  at  the time  of the
policy change.  For  subsequent  generations  of marriages,
adjustments  in prenuptial  transfers  will exactly  offset  the
shift  in child  allowances.
HOU8DnOLD  DSCZ3XONMAKING  AND  HOURZNOLD  LABOR  ALLOCATlON
In  most household  models-either  unitary  or collective,  labor
supply  is  treated  as the  residual  of demand  for  leisure.9  However,
because  most households  in  developing  countries  aro  both  producers  and
consumers,  a number  of additional  issues  arise. One  issue,  whether
production  and consumption  decisions  are separable,  atimulated  the
work summarized lit  Singh,  Squire,  and  Strauss  (1986). A second  issue
is  the  extent  to which  productive  resources,  notably  labor,  are
pooled. If  this is  not  the  case,  policies  requiring  the reallocation23
of labcv  within  the  household  may fail. Thla  aspect  has  received
little  a.ttention  in the  theoretical  literature  on household
decisiomuking (Jonis  1982  in an exception). Below,  several  possible
approaches  to  modeling  labor  allocation  within  the  household  are
suggested.
Webb's  (1989)  discussion  of the  organization  of farming
activities  amongst  households  in The  Gambia  are  ured  to motivate  this
analysis.  Webb  notsa  two features. The  flr't  is that  the  farm  is
unot  a  unitary  enterntiew  (Webb  1989,  24).  Instead,  land  is  divided
into  maruo  and  kamangyango  farms:
The  maruo  farm  compriosh  '-  set  of  fields  designated  to  provide
the  bulk  of  the  fooK r*eftjred  by  the  household  ....  This
enterprise  ...  is  under the control  of the compound  head  ....
The  haxoest of  -h*  k^^aaayango field, by  contrast, is
allocated  for individual  rather  than for communal  disposal.
Any person  in the compound  has,  the right  to a Aamangyango
field  for which he or she will be solely (or sometimes
jointly)  responsible.
Webb (1989,  28) further  notes  that  the  organization  of mrumo
farms  conforms  to the following  hierarchys at  the top  is the compound
head,  who retains  ultimate  control  over  crop  production.
But  the  compound  head  is  not  omniscient.  However  powerful  and
domineering  a single  figuro  of LQthority  may be, it would
simply  be impractical  for  one  person  to  make  all  the  decisions
that are necessary in the day-to-day  running of a  large
household  of diverse  individuals.
Consequently,  decisionmaking  is  delegated  to an upland  marao  manager
and  a rice  maro  manager.  In  turn,  these  individuals  can  call  on
other  household  members  to assist  with  production  in the  maruo fields.
For erample,  the  upland  mruo  manager  can  obtain  labor  from  other
males  residing  in  the compound,  male youths  and  boys (Webb  1988,  31).
The case  Webb describes  may  be somewhat  atypical  outside  of The
Gambia. However,  it  illustrates  a  key  issue. It  may be incorrect  to24
assum that  all  household  members  work solely  for  the  hourehold.
Rather,  a better  approach  might  be to see them an  individuals  who
work,  in  part,  for  a collective  entity,  and  partly  on their  own
account. Although  under  many  unitary  or collective  models  leisure  can
be considered  as  a  direct  analogue  to commodities,  the fact  that
productive  units  are  not  coincident  with  consumption  units  adds  an
additional  layer  of complexity. In  particular,  it introduces  problems
of incentives,  monitoring,  and  onforcement  for  the  model.
The  -xisting  unitary  and  collective  household  literature  does  not
adequately  address  this  issue. However,  work in  other  areas  such  as
on principal-agent  relations  points  to ways forward. This  work is
pre-znted  to show  that,  conceptually,  it is  possible  to develop
collective  models  of household  production  that  yield  empirical
predictions  different  from  those  obtained  via  a unitary  model.
The  discussion  draws  heavily  on work  by Putterman  (1980,  1981,
1986),  Putterman  and  Dioiorgio  (1985),  and  Son (1966). Under  an
assumption  of a dictatorial  household  head,  one  can  obtain  a Pareto
optimal  allocation  of household  resources  by allocating  an
individual's  labor  to household  production  to the  point  where  the
marginal  product  of this  labor  equals  that  person's  marginal  rate  of
substitution  between  consumption  of goods  and leisure.
Now  consider  a  noncooperative  model  in  which  each  person
maximizes  his  or her  own  utility  function  and, further,  that  each
person  selects  his  or her  own level  of labor  input,  taking  the labor
inputs  of other  household  members  as given. That  is,  a  change  in  one
individual's  labor  supply  does  not  induce  changes  in anyone  else's
labor  supply. (This  is  sometimes  referred  to as  the  Cournot
assumption.) Finally,  in  the absence  of a  dictator,  a  decision  rule
is specified  that allocates  household  production  to individual
members. Let *  be the  proportion  of output  distributed  according  to
need  and (1  - 0) distributed  according  to effort.25
Suppooe * - 0  Putterma  n's  model  shows  that  if  the  average
product  of  labor  is  greater  than  the  marginal  product  of  labor,  the
marginal  rate  of  substitution  (MRS)  between  good  and  leisure  will
exceed  the  marginal  product  of labor  (MPL).  This  is  not  Parato
effleient. Where  output  is  distributed  solely  according  to work
effort,  everyone  works  too  hard.  LesE  labor  input  would increase
total  welfare.  If  0  - 1, however,  the  model  finds  that  the  MR8  is
less  than  the  IPL.  When  output  is  distributed  solely  according  to
need,  everyone  works  too little.  An  optimal  solution  in  the  interval,
0 < C  < 1,  where  the  proportion  of output  dlitributed  according  to
effort  equals  the  ratio  of the  elasticity  of output  with  resp  et  to
labor  to the  share  of household  ineome  in  total  output  (Sen  1966,
369).
Putterman's  model  assumes  that  an  individual  can  only  choose
between  working  on  the  household's  land  and  consuming  leisure. It can
be shown  that  even  if this  assumption  is  relaxed,  the  resulting  levels
of labor  input  may not  be Parato  optimal  (Putterman  1986,  90-92).
That is,  even if one  allows  for  the  possibility  that l dividuals  can
also  work for  themselves,  as in  Webb's  example  of the  *kvangyango
farm,  individuals  may not  find  an  efficient  labor  allocation.
An  alternative  way  of addressing  this  issue  may  be found  in  the
principal-agent  model.  consider  the  case  of a  single  principal,  the
male  household  head,  and  a  single  agent,  his  wife.  The  head  needs  to
obtain  labor  from  his spouse  in  order  to produce  output  from  his  plot,
which  is assumed to  be fixed  in  size. His spouse  receives  income  from
two sources,  a  share  of the  output  produced  on the  head's  field,  and
production  on her own  account,  say  from  operating  her  own plot  of land
or running  her  own  business. The  head's  income  is  the value  of
production  on his  own field,  less  the  amount  paid  to other  household
members.26
Three  assumptions  are  now  made.  Thm first  is  the  Cournot
aosumption  noted  earlier.  Second,  that  the  sharing  rule,  A,,  is
chosen  so  an  to  quate  the agentso  marginal  rate  of  substitution
between  work  and  leisure  to  their  margLnal  product  of  labor.  The
amount  of  the  wife's  labor  supplied  under  this  condition  is  denoted  as
xi*  and  her  income  from  the  head's  plot  as  yi*. Finally,  and  most
importantly,  xi*  and  y,*  are  regarded  as  representing  norms  of  behavior
with  respect  to  labor  input  and  compensation  within  the  household.
Such  norms  are  analogous  to  the  noncooperative  equilibrium  within  a
household  as  specified  by  Lundberg  and  Pollak  (1992),  where  such  an
equilibrium  represents  traditional  gender  roles.
The  head  is  essentially  a  residual  claimant  to  production  on  his
plot.  As such,  it is in  his interest  to  encourage  other  members  to
supply  additional  labor.  one  means  of  doing  so  is  for  him  to  offer  an
ex  post  wreward"  for  labor  over  and  above  xi*.  The  reward  is  paid  in
terms  of  a  complemntary  input  necessary  for  the  agent  to  produce  on
her  own  account,  say,  for  example,  capital  that  is  rationed  elsewhere.
The spouse  has  an  incentive  to  seek  such  a  reward  as  it  will  increase
her income.  As such,  it may  be rational  for  her  to  work  beyond  the
point  where  her  MRS - MPL.  The  formal  proof  of  this is  given in
Paterson  (1985).
There  are several  additional  features  that  could  be added  to  the
model.  In  addition  to  "rewards,"  the  head  could  "punish"  agents  who
supplied  lses  than  xi*  labor  in the  sense  that  he could  reduce  the
share  of  output  that  accrues  to  such  an  individual. Second,  as the
spouse's  landholdings  increase,  it is necessary  for  the head  to  offer
larger  rewards  in  order  to  induce  additional  labor  supply.
Intuitively,  this  makes  some  sense,  as the returns  to  additlonal  labor
in  own  production  will  rise.  Conversely,  the  presence  of  additional
spouses,  the  existence  of  a  labor  market,  or  the ability  to  threaten  a
spouse  with  violence  should  she  refuse  to  provide  additional  labor,27
exogenous changes such as  those  induced  by  gender-bLased  development
projects,  will all  affect  the  reward  structure.
HOUUNIOLD  DXCUICOIXAEIO  AID  ZJNt3ol33AKTOUaL  DISMtRZ3WOU
In  the  praviou sectlon,  intrahousehold  allocation  of labor  was
examined. In  this section,  a second,  specific  aspect  of household
decisionmaking-the  distrLbution  of other  household  resources  amongst
members-is analyzed. The impact  of many  policy  Lnterventions  depends
on this %spect  of household  behavior. It is also  a key  determinant  of
the extent  to  which  economic  advantage  and  disadvantage  is  transmitted
across  generations. As there  are  a  number  of very  good reviews  of
this literature,  notably  Behrman  (1991,  1992)  and  Behrman  and
Deolalikar  (1988),  this  discussion  will  be relatively  brief.
Under  the  unitary  model,  parents  have  a single  set  of preferences
that  yields  a  utility  function  defined  in  terms  of their  consumption,
the adult  income  of each  child,  and  the  size  of transfers  made  to each
child (Behrman  1992). This utility  function  is  maximized  subject  to
two constraints: a parental  budget  constraint  and  the  earnings
production  function  for  each child,  itself  a function  of human  capital
investments  made in  that child  by parents  and  that  child's  initial
endowment. Behrman  (1992)  refers  to this very  general  framework  as
the "parental  altruism  model." Placing  restrictions  on this  general
approach  yields  two existing  models  of intrahousehold  resource
allocation.
One approach,  due  to Bocker  and  Tomes  (1976),  is to assume  that
parents  are  concerned  solely  with  their  children's  total  level  of
wealth. It is further  assumed  that  parents  have  equal  concern  for
each child. Human  capital  Lnvestments  are  made in children  best
placed  to generate  a higher  rate  of return  on these.  That  is,  parents
invest  in  their  children  in such  a  way so as  to reinforce  differences
in child  endowments. Transfers  are  made  to more  poorly  endowed28
offspring  in  order  to equalize  children's  wealth. Behruan  (1992)
refers  to this  an  the "wealth  model."
A second  approach  is  the "separable  earnings-transfors  model"
(Behrman,  Pollak,  and Taubman  1982).  Here,  children's  income  as
adults  and  parontal  transfers  to  children  are  separable  wLthln  the
parentl welfare  functlon.  ThLs  assumptLon  permLts  attentlon  to  be
focused  on the  determlnants  of  investment  ln children.  These
Lnvestmnts  are  gulded  by two  concerns. Friot,  parents  may be
interested  in  ensurLng  that  all  children  are  equally  well-off.
Alternatlvely,  they  may have  preferences  for  particular  childr@ni  for
example,  boys  over glrls,  first  born  over latter  born,  thelr  own
chLldren  over  those  whom they  are  raislng  as foster  chlldron. This
aspect  shall  be termed wequlty"  concerns,  though,  of  course,  it  is
entirely  possible  that  parents  prefer  unequal  outcomes  among  thelr
chlldron. As ln the  wealth  model,  parents  also  desLre  to  maxlmize  the
return  on the Lnvestment  ln  thelr  chlldron. ThLs  is called
wefficLincy  concerns."
Suppose  parents  care  only  about  equity  and  have  no  concerns
regardlng  efflclincy.  Such preferences  Lmply  that  they  wlll  seek  to
equalLze  thelr  children's  future  earnings. Note  that  this  dooe  not
imply  that  all  chlldren  will  be treated  equally. Conslder  the case  of
paents who  want  their  daughter  and  son  to  reclve equal  earnlngs.
Suppose  the  daughter  wlll  face  dLocrLmlnation  in  the  labor  market;
specifically,  her  wages  will be loe  than  that of her  comparably
qualLfied  brother  doing  the samo  work.  Here,  parents  wlll devote  more
resources  to thelr  daughter  (for  example,  they  provlde  her  wlth more
educatLon)  ln  order  to eualize future  earnlngs. Conversely,  where
parents  seek  to maximize  the  total  future  earnLngs  of their  offspring,
they lnvest  relatively  more in  those  chlldren  with  the  best future
prospects. In the  example  considered  here,  parents  would  Lnvest  more
ln  thelr  son  than ln  thelr  daughter. That  is,  parents  "roLnforce"29
exiating  inequalities  in child  endowment.  It is possible  to imagine
a series  of intermediate  cases  where  both equity  and  efficiency
concerns  play a role.
Note again  that  the  unitary  model  is far  from  silent  on  the
question  of intrahousehold  resource  allocation. The  principal
criticism  of this  approach  from  a collective  standpoint  are  the
implicit  assumptions  that  parental  preferences  are  unified  and  that
chlldren  have  no lnfluence  on decisLons  made  regardlng  thelr  future
well-being  (Folbr-  1986). However,  as Alderman  and  Gertler  note
(1993),  even if a  collective  approach  is  used,  it is  still  necessary
to explain  why a  particular  household  member  chooses  to invest  more ln
one  child  than  another. The  wealth  and  the  separable  earnings-
transfers  models  are  particularly  well sulted  for  this  purpose.
The parental  altruism  model  rules  out  the  possibility  that
parents  might  wish  to influence  the future  behavlor  of their
offspring. Bernheim,  Shleifer,  and  Summers  (1985),  however,  develop  a
collective  model  of parent-chlld  relations  in a noncooperative
bargainlng  framework. They  assume  that  parental  utility  is a function
of parental  consumption,  utility  of their  child,  and "child's
attentLon  to parents." The  child  derives  utility  from  his  own
consumption  and  from  supplying  "attention  to parents." The child  is
assumed  to tire  of giving  attention  before  his  parents  tire  of
receiving  it.  The  model,  therefore,  considers  differences  in
preferences  across  generations,  although  it presumes  a unitary  model
for  parents.
Suppose  the child  chooses  a certain  level  of attention.
Subsequently,  the parents  mako a  transfer,  such  as a  bequest,  to the
child. How is  consumption  and  attention  allocated? Suppose  the
parents  do not  attempt  tn influence  the  level  of attention  given  by
the chlld. Through  the  appropriate  transfer,  the  parents  can
determine  the level  of their  own consumption  and  that  of the  child.30
However,  Bernheim,  Shlaifer,  and  Summers show  that  the  resulting
allocation  may  not  be Pareto  optimal. The  chlld  could  supply  more
attention  without  a change  in  his  well-being  and  parental  utility
would  increase.
How can  the  parents  induce  greater  attention?  Suppose they
threaten  to disinherit  the  child  unless  he  or she  supplies  a given
level  of attention. If  this  threat  is  to be credible,  the  offer  must
provLde  a  level  of utility  to the child  at least  as high  as that
provLded  by the "disinheritance  level." Can parents  credibly  threaten
dlsinheritance?  If  the  parents  have  only  one individual  to whom  they
can  leave  their  estate,  then  the  threat  is  not credible. Bocause
bquests are  unlikely  to be made  to others,  the  beneficiary  knows  that
his  or her inheritance  will  be unaffected  by his  or her  behavior. The
parents  cannot  induce  higher  levels  of care.  But if  there in  at least
one  other  potential  beneficiary,  the  threat  is  credible.
gEsentially,  the  question  of how  resourcoc  are allocated  across
generations  revolves  around  throe  issues: At the  parental  level,  what
(equity?  efficiency?  or both?)  determines  how  resources  are  allocated
amongst  children?  Are  parental  preferences  unified?  Do parents,
individually  or collectively,  have  an incentive  to behave
strategically  with resp  ct  to their  offspring? Though  theoretical
aspects  of each issue  have received  attention,  there  have  been  no
attempts  to integrate  these  issues.
INTRABOU5SUOLD  RESOURCE  ALLOCATIONt AN EDWIRICAL  REVIEW
We now  turn  to a selective  review  of the  evidence  on the
following  questions: Is  income  pooled  within  the household?  What  does
labor  supply  data  tell  us?  How  do households  allocate  consumption  and
human  capital  investment  amongst  members?31
I  Income  Pooled? Testina  the  Unitary  Model  Against  a Dread  Class  of
Alt-rnativas
Is Incom Pooled  by Gender? The  unitary  model  implies  that all  inome
sources  within  the household  are  pooled. However,  the  view that
income  in  not  pooled  within  the  household  has  figured  prominently  in
sociological  and anthropological  studies. It is widely  perceived  that
men spend  some  of their  income  on goods  for  their  personal
consumption. Alcohol,  cigarettes,  status  consumer  goods,  even "female
coqmpnionship"  have  been  noted.  By contrast,  women are believed  to  be
more likely  to  purchase  goods  for  children  and  for  general  household
consumption.  Guyer  (1980)  is  particularly  noted  for  this  observation,
although  a  number  of  other  researchers  have  commaented on  the
phenomenon  as  well.1'
These  studies,  while  extremely  valuable  in focusing  attention  on
this  area,  do not constitute  a test  of the  income  pooling  hypothesis.
To  see  why  this  is so,  consider  the  following  example. Suppose  an
exogenous  change  occurs  that  raises  a  woman's  wages  and  thereby
induces  a  change  in  her  allocation  of  time.  In  the  unitary  model,  the
household  may  decide  to  reorganize  household  production  so  as  to
increase  the  woman's  labor-market  participation.  In  a  cooperative
bargaining  context,  women may  decide  to  renegotiate  the  gains  from
marriage  on  the  basis  of  this  new  (or  enhanced)  earning  opportunity.
Thus,  increased  women's  labor-force  participation  may  alter  the
distribution  of  income  within  the  household  and  this  could  affect  the
pattern  of  household  expenditures.  Again,  this  would  be predicted  by
both  approaches. In  the  unitary  model,  the  change  in  expenditures  may
reflect  the  reallocation  of  members'  time.  For  example,  households
may  purchase  fuel  rather  than  gather  it.  Women may  purchase  maize
flour  rather  than  grind  maize  themselves.32
Similarly,  one  may have  a unitary  household  in  which  the
correlation  between  women's  cash income  and  acquisition  of  certain
goods  reflects  differences  in  purchasing  productivities.  If  women  are
working  as traders  in the  marketplace,  the  household  may economize  on
transaction  costs  if  the  woman  purchases  food  in  the  market  (and  the
man's  income  is  used  to purchase  other  goods). It  would  be hard  to
distinguish  this household  from  one in  which  an increase  in  women's
earnings  outside  the  household  changes  expenditure  patterns,  because
it raises  the  woman's  bargaining  power (either  because  her  threat
point  in higher  or because  her  perceived  contribution  within  the
household  has increased). This  problem  is  termed 'observational
equivalence." That is,  the  phenomena  observed  by the studies  cited
above  car  be explained  by either  the unitary  or collective  model.  It
is for  this reason  that economists  have  sought  additional  means  of
gaining  insights  Into  household  behavior.
In  Ulph's (1988)  noncooperative  model,  budget  shares  are  a
function,  in part,  of the intrahousehold  distribution  of income.
Specifically,  there  exists  "...  a very clear  relationship  between  the
share  of expenditure  on commodities  and  the  share  of household  income
accruing  to the wife" (Ulph  1988,  45).  On the  empirical  side,  von
Braun  St  al. (1988)  find  a positive  relationship  between  the
proportion  of cereals  produced  under  women's  control  and  household
consumption  of calories  in Gambian  households. Garcia  (1990)  finds
that raising  the share  of income  accruing  to wives  in Philippine
households  increased  acquisition  of calories  and  protein. However,
both studies  assume  that labor  supply  decisions  are  exogenous. A bias
may  exist  in that  the  factors  that influence  the labor  supply  decision
may  be those  that  account  for  the  differences  in budgets. Hoddinott
and  Haddad  (1992)  partly  control  for  this  by using  women's  predicted
share  of household  cash  income  (PFINC). Their  approach  assumes  that
certain  variables,  such  as the  proportion  of landholdings  operated  by33
womn,  women's  share  of  household  business  capital,  and  the  ratlo  of
women's  to  men's  ducation,  will influence  P?ZNC  but  not  expendlture
shares  directly. Thoy find  that  doubling  women's  share  of cash income
within  Ivorian  households  raised  the  budget  share  of food  and lowered
the  budget  shares  of  alcohol  and  cigarettes. These  results  are
conditional  on the identifying  restrictions  they impose.  However,
their  results  are robust  to changes  in functional  form,  are  reflected
in reduced-form  estimates,  and  concur  with budget  shares  obtained  from
an  examination  of  single-sex  households.
Alternatlvely,  one  can  use  unearned  income,  under  the  assumption
that  it is  independent  of labor  choices,  to  identify  the  impact  of
changes  in  female  income  compared  to that of  males.  Schultz  (1990
601-602)  notes  that
The  challenge  to the neoclassical  model of household  demand
arises  if  nonearned  income  of  dlfferent  family  members is
observLA  to  affect  differently  the household's  allocation  of
resources.  If  nonearned income  (or ownership of  the
underlying  asset)  influences  family  demand  behavior
differently,  depending  on who  in the family controls  the
income (or owns the asset),  then the preferences  for that
demand  must differ  across  individuals  and  such families  must
not  completely  pool  nonearned  income.
An example  of this  approach  is  given  by Thomas  (1990). Drawing
on survey  data  from  Brazil,  he examines  the  differential  impact  of
nonlabor  income  in  the  hands  of  men  and  women.  Thomas  rejects  income
pooling  in  the  demand  for  per capita  caloric  and  protein  intakes,
fertility,  child  survival,  and  weight-for-height  for  children  less
than 8 years  old.  The results  for  child  survival  are  particularly
powerful;  increases  in  the  mother's  unearned  income  raises  the
probability  of child  survival  by  20 times  that  of a  comparable
increase  in  the father's  unearned  income.
As Thomas  acknowledges,  it can  be argued  that nonlabor  income  is
not  purely  exogenous,  because  it  reflects  previous  labor  supply34
decisions.  Second,  lt  may be  measured  wLth considerable  error  and
this  may  contaminate  parameter  estimates.  Thlrd,  on its  own,  unearned
income  cannot  be  taken  an a  threat  polnt. For  example,  lndlvlduals
may be receLvLng  unearned  lncome  in  the form  of slck  benefits  because
they are  temporarily  ill.  Such  lneome  cannot  be consLdered  a  pure,
threat-point  shifter.  Similarly,  some  unearned  income  (such  as  dowry)
may  be  condltlonal  on  being  married;  Lt,  too,  cannot  be  considered  a
threat-point  shifter.  Thomas  (1993)  tests  whether  these  results  are
robust  to  treating  nonlabor  Lncome  as an aggregate  or using  only asset
Lncme.  He finds  that  under  both  deflnltions,  income  in the  hands  of
women  is associated  wlth  a  larger  lncrease  in  the share  of the
household  budget  devoted  to  human  capltal  (household  services,  health,
and  educatLon)  and  also  leioure  (recreatLon  and ceremonies)  goods.
SLmilarly,  Schultz  (1990)  distLnguLshes  between  transfer  and
property  income  ln his  study  of labor  supply  decisions  Ln  Thailand.
He flnds  that  unearned  lneome  has  a  sLgnLfLcant  effect  on women's
labor  supply. "ThLi  pattern  ls clearest  ln  the  case  of Thai  women,
where  the own  nonearned  lncome  effect  on particlpatlon  is sLx  times  as
large  as that  of thelr  spouse's  nonearned  lncome. The  preponderant
sign  of all  the labor  supply  effects  of transfer  and  property  income
is negative,  as anticipated."  However,  he also fLnds  that  women's
transfer  income  is  positively  and  signiflcantly  related  to fertllity,
whereas  women's  property  lncome  has no such  effect. He notes  (p.  623)
that  ...  the connectlon  between  transfer  income  and  fertility  may
reflect  the  reverse  causatlon  to that  hypotheelzed  here,  where  women
wlth  more children  to support  are  more likely  to recelve  transfers
from  family  and  other  groups  in society."
Horny  and  McBlroy  (1988)  examined  data from  a 1967  sample  of
American  married  men and  women  residing  ln  households  where  both
partners  worked. They  dLeaggregated  nonlabor  lncome  into  transfer
(pensions,  voterans  payments,  workmen's  compensation,  other  disability35
payments,  Aid  to Families  with  Dependent  Children)  and  business
(business,  farm,  rental,  and interest)  income. Transfer  income  is  of
particular  interest  because  a  number  of  lts  components  (such  as
disability  and  veteran's  payments)  are  independent  of  marital  status.
Borney  and  McIlroy  found  limited  evidence  that  male  and  female
nonlabor  incom  has  a  differential  impaot  on  leisure  choice  of  males
(male  transfer  income  reduces  male  labor  supply),  though  thl  was  not
so  for  fmaleo  or a composite  consumption  commodity."
_a_  Poli  s Generations. In addLtion  to tests  of  incom
poollng,  tests  of joLnt  movemnts of consumption  have  been used  to
study  the allocation  within  a  family. Consider  Altonji,  Hayashi,  and
Kotlikoff's  .992)  recent  test  of altruism. They  note that  if
parents  and children  are  altruistically  linked,  their  consumption  will
be based  on a collective  budget  constraint,  and  the  distribution  of
consumption  between  parents  and  children  will  be independent  of the
distribution  of their  incomes." Drawing  on panel  data from  the  United
States,  they  reject  this hypothosis. They  find  that  the resource
position  of  a  particular  family  member-as measured  by total income,
nonlabor  income,  home  equity,  or  wage  rates-influences  the
consumption  of  that  member.
The  study  is  fairly  robust  to  alternative  measures  of  income  and
to  dynamic  and  fixed-effect  formulations.  While  it  is  still  possible
that  the  rejection  of  altruism  is  due  to  a  definition  of  the
functional  family  that  is  different  than  that  used  by  the  household,
the  study  provides  a  convincing  rejection  of  a  polar  case  of
intragenerational  altruism.
Income  Poolina  in  Pareto  Efficient  Models. The  econometric  studies
discusied  above  are  strongly  critical  of  the  incomo  pooling
hypothesis.  However,  they  do  not  provide  an  unambiguous  rejection  of36
unitary  models  nor  do thes  studles  uncover  the  process  of  allocation
that  does  prevail. Recent  work  by Bourgulgnon  at al. (1992,  1993)
derives  a  met  of testable  restrictions  by solely  assuming  that
household  decisions  are (Pareto)  efficient.
Brownlng  et al. (1992)  develop  the  idea  that  certain  goods  within
the  household  are  excluclv  ethat  is,  they  are  consvrmd  only  by one
person. This  can  be used to recover  the  household's  sharing  rule.
They  use  expenditure  data from  childless  Canadian  couples  who  work
full  tlm.  Using  women's  clothlng  as an exclusive  good,  they recover
the  sharing  rule  parameters. Bourguignon  et al. (1993)  construct  a
general  model  that  encompasses the  unitary  and  collective  frameworks
as  special  cases. This  generates  two  hypothesess  (i)  if income  is
not  pooled,  the  coefficients  for  male  and  female  inome  in an
expenditure  equation  should  be  significantly  different  from  zero;  and
(Li)  the  existence  cf a  cooperative  model  requires  that  certain
restrictions  be  placed  on  the  coefficients  of total  household-  and
indLvidual-level  Lncoms.  Uslng  French  data  consisting  of  married
couples  working  full  time  with  no  or one  child,  incomo  pooling  is
rejected  but  the cooperative  approach  is  not  rejected.
What Does  Labor  Suooly  Data Tell  Uo?
While  leisure  is  conceptually  similar  to  other  conmodities,  even
in  the context  of  unitary  models  of  households,  it is  recognized  as  an
exclusive  good.  Thus,  the literature  on labor  supply  provides  a
number  of alternative  approaches  to testing  models  of intrahousehold
allocation. In a  unitary  model,  cross-substitution  wage effects  must
be equal-"ths effect  of an income-compensated  increase  in  the
husband's  wage  on the  wife's  labor  supply  must be identical  to the
effect  of an income-compensated  increase  in  the  wife's  wage  on the
husband's  labor  supply  (Lundberg  1988,  225).  However,  results
pr-e-nted  in  Ashenfelter  and  Heckman  (1974),  Knieoner  (1976),37
Killingsworth  (1983),  and  Lundberg  (1988)  do not support  this
prediction.
By contrast,  specific  aspects  of collective  modols  have  received
empirical  support. The  differential  effects  of unearned  income  on
labor  supply  havo already  been  noted. Kooreman  and  Kapteyn  (1990)
present  Dutch  evidence  on couples  working  at leaat  15  hours  per  week
consistent  with a  Pareto-efficient  model,  with  a  noncooperative
equilibrium  acting  an the  threat  point. of  couroe,  all  these  results
are subject  to caveats  regarding  robustness  to changes  in functional
form,  and issues  relating  to sample  selection  bias (for  example,  many
of the samples  used are  drawn  from  married  couples). But  less  has
been  attempted  with respect  to the "collective"  modeling  of household
production.
Jones'  (1983,  1986)  studies  of rice  cultivation  in  north  Cameroon
provides  several  results  of interests
*  women  supply  a suboptimal  amount  of labor  to their  husbands'  rice
fields,  preferring  to spend  tlme  working  on the'r  own sorghum
plots. A profit-maximizing  household  would  increase  the  amount
of  women's  labor  supplied  to rice  production.
*  women  receive  compensation,  in  cash and  kind,  for  labor  they
provide  to their  husbands. This  amount  rose as  more labor  was
supplied. Also,  senior  wives  in polygamous  households  and  women
whose  husbands  still  owed  bride-price  received  higner  levels  of
compensation.  Jones  notes (1983,  1053),  "Ne  can ill-afford  to
dispute  his  wife's  right  to compen'ation  since  he needs  the
additional  income  he receives  from  his  wife's  labor  on a second
rice field."
*  the level  of compensation  paid is less  than the  market  wage.
One might wonder  why women continue  to work for their
husbands  if they are compensated  at a rate much lower
than what they  could  earn working  as hired  labor.  The
answer  is  that,  in  principle,  married  women  are  expected38
to  work  on  their  husbands'  fields  if  they  are  not  working
on  their  own.  If  they  refuse  to work  on  their  husbands'
fields,  they risk  a  beating.  (Jones  1986,  111).
These  features  are consistent  with  the  principal-agent  model
sketched  out  earlier. The  allocation  of labor  is Pareto  inefficient.
As  predicted,  compensation  rises  am labor  supply  is  increased.
Factors  such  as seniority  within  the  household,  outstanding  bride-
price  payments,  society's  tolerance  of  physical  violence  (an  example
of  an extrahousehold  environmental  parameter),  all affect  the  level  of
compensation  received.
Jones'  example  is not  an isolated  one. Other  came studies
documenting  conflict,  compulsion,  and  negotiation  over  womn's  labor
allocation,  rather  than  the  dictates  of  a household  head,  include
Conti (1979),  Day (1981),  Haugerud  (1982),  Koenig  (1982),  Spiro  (1984,
1985),  Burfisher  and  Horenstein  (1985),  McMillan  (1987),  Babalola  and
Dennis  (1988),  Carney  (1988),  Funk  (1988),  ongaro  (1988',  and  Leach
(1991). More  general  discussions  of  this  literature  include  Roberts
(1979),  Guyer (1981),  Gladwin  and  McKillan  (1988),  Whitehead  (1990),
Kab-er  (1991),  and  Dey (1993). The  message  of these  studies  is
succinctly  summarized  by Whitehead  (1990,  452),  "More  than  one study
has identified  women's  refusal  to perform  the family  labor  that the
project  had  planned  for  or demanded  of them  as contributing  to the
failure  of the  development  project."
While  this evidence  does  not  provide  rigorous  tests  of the
collective  models  described  earlier,  they do provide  some  qualitative
evidence  that simplifying  assumptions  much  as the  pooling  of all  labor
are  flawed.
Observed  Patterns  of Individual  Welfare  Within  the  Household39
There  existc  an  extensive  literature  on  gender  differences  in
welfare  outcomea,  documenting,  for  example,  a bias in  favor  of  boys in
mortalLty  rates (SOn  1990),  nutrition  and  health  (Behrman  1988,  1992u
Harrins  1990),  and  education  (Appleton  1992). Similarly,  Subramanian
and  Deaton  (1990)  find  greater  reductions  in  the consumption  of "adult
goods  with  additional  boys in  the family  compared  to girls.' 2
Svedberg  (1990)  provides  an  African  counterexample  in  the context  of
nutrition,  which serves  to spur  the  need for  a theoretical
understanding  of why such  patterns  arise  in some  societies  and  why
thoy  do not in others.
Ividence  of bargaining  between  generations  exists  in a  number  of
contexts. Stark  and  Lucas (1988)  note  that  migrants'  transfers  in
Botswana  increase  when  their  rural  households  experience  drought.
However,  a further  prediction  of the altruism  model  is the  existence
of a negatLve  relationship  between  monetary  transfers  and  the  income
or wealth  of the recipient. Lucas  and  Stark (1985)  find  the  reverse
in Botswana,  as does  Cox (1987)  in the  United  States  and Hoddinott
(1992b,  1993)  in Kenya. One  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  is  that
donor-recipient  relations  are  partially  guided  by strategic
considerations.  Recall  that  in the  Bernheim,  Shleifer,  and  Summers
(1985)  model,  parents  have  an a priori  reason  to influence  the
behavior  of their  offspring. Bernheim,  Shl-ifer,  and  Summers  present
supporting  evidence  from  the  United  States. Hoddinott  (1992a)
roplicates  their  results  using  data from  western  Kenya.  In his  survey
area,  land  is passed  from  fathers  to sons--daughters  do not  receive  an
inheritance. He finds  that,  ceteris  paribus,  wealthier  elderly
parents  are able  to induce  greater  monetary  transfers  (and,  to a
losser  extent,  time transfers)  from  sons  but  not  daughters--a  result
consistent  with a bargaining  interpretation  of intergenerational
relations. Note that  all  these  results  are  conditional  on past40
investments  by parents  in  their  children,  an  especially  strong
assumption.
An  the  empirical  literature  in  this  area is  well sorved  by the
above  studies  and  other  reviews,  notably  Behrman  (1991,  1992),  B-hrman
and  Doolalikar  (1988),  and  Pitt (1993),  the  approach  here is to
highlight  several  key issues.
The first  is to stress  that  work in  the  unitary  framework  has
been  extre-  ly helpful  in identifying  some  of the  processes  involved
in the intrahousehold  distribution  of resources. In  particular,  this
approach  can  be used  to link  different  aspects  of resource  allocation.
Pitt,  Rosenzweig,  and  Hassan  (1990)  study  the  allc'ation  of food
within  Bangladeshi  households  in  relationship  to both  labor  supply  and
individual  health. A key  conclusion  is that  households  exhibit
aversion  to inequality,  in  effect  taxing  more  productive  members.
A second  issue  is that  differencos  across  individuals,  where  they
occur,  are  the outcome  of an allocation  process;  they are  not  inherent
to any  single  model  of the  household. Indeed,  Rosenzweig  and
Schultz's  (1984)  argument  in favor  of a  parsimonious  model  of the
joint  family  and  Folbre's  (1984)  challenge  to it  disputed  the process,
resulting  in,  but not  the fact  of,  male-female  differences  in India.
Systematic  differences  in  welfare  outcomes  by age,  gender,  or
relationship  to household  head  reveal  a  preference-one that  often  is
at odds  with observers  outside  the  household-but in the  absence  of
additional  information,  the  existence  of preferences  does  not  provide
the  basis  to determine  how  differences  in  preferences  are  resolved.
Thomas  (1991)  provides  ovidence  that  within-household  inequality
patterns  shift  as income  patterns  shift  in Brazil. This evidence,
then,  is analogous  to the  use  of preferences  for  commodities  to
uncover  sharing  rules--albeit  a  particularly  important  example  from
the standpoint  of policy. Haddad  and  Hoddinott  (1993)  provide  similar
evidence  for  rural  COte  d'Ivoire. Controlling  for  unobservable41
household  characteristics,  they  show  that  increasing  womn's  share  of
household  cash income  leads  to improvements  in  boys'  helght-for-age
relative  to girls.
Third,  the  unitary  model  often  relies  on an assumption  that  the
household  head in an altruist,  taking  the  well-being  of others  into
account. This assumption  in difficult  to maintain  when  the indivldual
assumed  to be altruistic  is also  the perpetrator  of physical  violence
against  other  members. SociologLcal  and croon-cultural  ethnographic
studies  show  that  wife-beating  occurs  in  virtually  all  societies  a
In  this issue  tangential  to the  modeling  of household  behavior? The
authors  believe  not.  First,  Jones  (1986)  specifically  mentions
violence  as a  means  of enforcing  labor  allocation  in  Cam  roon.
Second,  altruism  is necessary  in  order  to generate  Becker's  rotten  kid
theorm.  The fact  that  domestic  violence  is so widespread,  and so
common,  calls  into  question  the  validity  of this  assumption. Finally,
extra-environmental  parameters  appear  to affect  the  likelihood  and
severity  of dometic violence. Brchak (1984)  found  little  spouse
abuse  in a  poelle  village  in rural  Liberia,  where  neighbors  quickly
interferod  in  domestic  disputes. By contrast,  in  urban  areas  of
Liberia,  where  external  intervention  was less  prevalent,  the incidence
of abuse  was higher. Tauchan,  Witt-,  and  Long (1991)  find  that
amongst  low-  and  middle-income  American  families,  increases  in the
woman's  income  lowers  the level  of violence  (though  this  variable  is
not always  significant).  For  high-income  couples,  in  which  most  of
the  income  is his, increases  in  -;.ther  person's  income  serves  to lower
violence." 4 They also  find  tha,  having  a  place  to stay  if threatened
also lowers  the  number  of violent  incidents. Domestic  violence
appears  to be an example  where  IZPs  affect  the intrahou-shold
distribution  of welfare.
LIMITATIONS  OF CURRENT  TISTS  OF NOuNKITARY  NODUS42
Central  to many  of  the  mpLrLcal  studies  that  test alternative
models  of intrafamLly  or lntrahousehold  allocatLon  are  teats  of
whether  the impact  of  women's  Lncome  dlffers  from  that of  man.
Desplte  the  range  of evidence  acquLred,  there  are legltlmate
econometrlc  licues  on whlch  challenges  to the  lnterpratatlon  of the
results  can  be based. For  example,  as mentloned  above,  lt  is widely
recognlsed  that  observed  wage  Lncome  is an lnappropriate  variable  for
testing  models  of LntrafamLly  allocatlon,  slnce  that  income  reflects
household  cholces  about  nonmarket  actlvltles  as  well as the  allocatlon
of leisure  wlthln  the  household.  Thus  nonlabor  Lncom  (transfers  and
penslons  as well as  returns  to assets)  li  offered  as  an exogenous
measure  of resource  control.  Furthermore,  to  be  credible  as  a test of
models d  p  ndent  on  a threat  polnt,  nonlabor  lncome  must  not  be
contlngent  on  the  lncom  reciplent  remaining  ln a  marrlage.
Such lncome,  however,  may  be consLdered  endogenous  ln a  llfe-
cycle  context  lf asset  ownershLp  or penslon  elLgibillty  stems  from
provlous  labor  partLclpatLon  rather  than,  say,  lnherltance  or
dowrles."  Any  current  unobserved  dlfforences  ln tastes  and
productivLty  may  also  have  been  present  ln  the  past  and,  thus,  have
lnfluenced  asset  accumulatlon.  Moreover,  asset  income  is subject  to
measurement  errors  that  may  be systematLcally  correlated  wLth other
household  characterlitics.  8ince  Lt is dlfficult  to assign  ownership
to one lndlvldual,  asset  income  may also  not  be asslgnable.
Interviewers  responslble  for  obtalnlng  tho  data  used  ln subsequent
econometric  tests,  however,  may  make  assignment  on  a  systematic  basis
(often  to  the  male)  to  avoid  either  omlislon  or  double  counting  of  the
resource  flow.
Simllarly,  lf control  over  resources  li  enhanced  by  concealing
Lncome,  there  may  be  a  systematIc  blas  from  underreportlng.  Even  ln
the  absence  of endogenelty,  measurement error  that  differs  by  source
of  Lncome  can  generate  spurlous  patterns  of  dLfferences  Ln43
expenditures  by income  source,  that is,  increase  the  chance  of a  false
rejection  of pooling  restrictions.
Commodity  demand  models  also  generally  reject  the restriction  of
weak  separabilLty  of leisure  and  goods  (Alderman  and  Sahn,  1993t
Browning  and  Meghir  1991). While  both  coemodity  and  labor  allocations
are  used  to test  models  of intrafamily  decisions,  few  commodity  models
have  addressed  the  potential  bias  from  ignoring  labor  supply.
Moreover,  one  study  that  explicitly  tests  the  restriction  implied  by  a
Nash-bargaining  model (Horney  and  Xcglroy  1988)  is limited  as  it poses
a  demand  system  in  which  leisure  and  comDodity  demand  are  separable.
In  addition  to  having  testable  single-equation  restriction  on
income  and,  in  ome  cases,  cross-equation  restriction  on  comnodity
substitution,  collective  models  may  offer  testable  restriction
regarding  the  impact  of  NIPs  on  demand.  These  are  particularly
interesting  as  they  may  suggest  policy  measures  that  can  achieve
reallocation  towards,  say,  children's  consumption. As  with  testing  of
income  pooling,  however,  tosting  of restrictions  on the impact  of ZIP
faces  econometric  challenges  and  data limitations. ZIPs  are  unlikely
to vary  much in cross-sectional  data  sets.  Where  variation  may be
found--over  time  or across  regions--regional  difference  in tastes  or
impact  of community  unobservables  may  be credJblo  alternative
explanations  for  the  patterns  observed.
As  an illustration,  consider  Rao  and  Greene's  (1991)  detailed
analysis  of the impact  of bargaining  on fertility  in  Brasil. This
study  is sensitive  to the  possible  endogeneity  of individual  choices
and  thus  concentrates  on regional-level  variables  as the  main evidence
for  bargaining  over fertility  choices. For  example,  the study
estimates  a negative  relatil  iship  between  fertility  and  the  ratio  of
males  aged  25-29  to females  aged  15-19  in  the region. A reasonable
interpretation  of  this  result  takes  it  as an indication  of the
availability  of  alternative  spouses.  As  this  ratio  increases,  women44
have a greater  chance of  remarrylng,  hence  a gr-ater  abillty  to
bargain  for  the smaller  familles  they  prefer. RegLons  that  have a
lower  average  preforence  for  fortillty,  however,  wlll also  have higher
male-female  ratlos  (due  to the age  gap ln the  measure). Thus,
variations  ln reglonal  preferences  may  also contrlbute  to the  result
observed  and  the suggestLve  results  may  not  be completely  free  of
slmultanelty  bias.
Rao and  Creen-  vliw fertility  decllons  both as  products  of
household  joLnt  decisions  and  strong  determLnants  of condltlonal
cholc-  sets.  For  most  purposes,  however,  studles  of household
resource allocation  take  the household  structure  as predetermined.
Yet,  clearly,  the  formatlon  and  dlssolutlon  of households--or  even
seasonal  searuatlons  due  to labor  mlgratlon-is central  to any
question  of LntrafamLly  allocatlon. However,  as  McElroy  observes
(1993),  *The  same  phenomena  that shlft  threat  points  ln bargainlng
models  also  control  the  galns  from  marriage  realLzed  ln a marrLage
market." Thli  allows  for  a number  of empLrLcal  applications  of
bargaLnLng  models  to fertillty  and  marrlage. However,  it also  means
that  lt is  extremely  difficult  to  model  household  formatLon
sLmultaneously  wlth  budget  allocatlons  condltlonal  on household
structure. Thus,  the  comparisons  between  demand  of  marrled  versus
divorced  indlvlduals  offered  by McElroy  (1990)  are  hard  to implement,
due  to an lnabillty  to account  for  the sample  selectLon.
Collectlve  models  of intergeneratlonal  relatlons  (such  as
Bernh-lm,  Shlelfer,  and Summers  1985,  and  Hoddlnott  1992b)  assum  that
the number  of chlldren,  thelr  educatlon,  and  earnlngs  are  exogenous.
Yet as  the  llterature  summarLzed  ln Behrman  (1992)  makes  abundantly
clear,  chlld  quallty  and  quantlty  ls the  outcome  of parental
d-clslonmaklng,  a feature  lgnored  ln  empLrical  tests  of these  models.
It ls,  nevertheles,  difficult  to lmagine  that  econometrlc
dlfficultles  singly  or joLntly  can  account  for  the  numerous  rejectLons45
of income  pooling. That  is,  although  not  nececsarily  perfect  tests,
many of the  tests  of restriction  implied  by the  unitary  model  are
plausible  tests.  Collectively,  the evidence  may be taken  as  shifting
the  burden  of proof  so that  unitary  models  need  to be  defended  rather
than  maintained.
However,  rejecting  pooling  is  not,  of course,  the  same as
accepting  an alternative  model. Various  tenable  bargaining  and
sharing  models  can  generate  conditions  under  which income  pooling  is
rejected  and/or  ZIPs contribute  to consumption  patterns. Thus,  there
is  a particular  appeal  in  the  approach  taken  by Chiappori  (1993),
because  if one  good is  assignable,  a sharing  rule can  be derived  for
the  entire  decision  process.  While  this  approach  is  in contrast  to
the  greater  structure  that  needs  to  be  imposed  in  order  to  recover  the
details-if  not  necessarily  the  flavor--of  the  bargaining  process,  it,
nevertheless,  does offer  a  means  of distinguishing  between  alternative
models.
Moreover,  specific  tests  of  bargaining  or sharing  may depend  on
cultural  conditions. For  example,  not  only  do the  results  of
Bourguignon  et al. (1992,  1993)  depend  on the  economic  and legal
conditions  that  make  the assumption  of fixed  labor  supply  arguable,
they  pertain  to a social  structure  that differs  on many significant
points  from  that in  developing  countries. In  many developing
countries,  households  are  larger,  more apt  to contain  more than  one
adult  of the  same  gender  and  generation,  and  more likely  to contain
three  generations  than  French  or Canadian  households. Similarly,
separation  and  reformation  of households  due  to  migration  and  child
fostering  will affect  allocation  processes  differently  in different
contexts. The fact  that  cultures  differ  is  not, of course,  a direct
limitation  of their  analysis  of French  or Canadian  consumers,  but  a
caveat  that reiterates  the need  for  a  range  of studies  before
generalities  can  be drawn.46
The  focus  of  thi  section  has  boon on  the  procesc_s-  unitary  and
collectlve--by  which  intrahoucehold  outcomes  are  generated,  rather
than the  outcomes  per  so.  This  emphasis  reflects  the  perceptionc  of
the authors  of where  the  gaps  are  in the  intrahouschold  literature.
On the  unitary  model  of  the  household,  it  has  been  argued  that  its
theoretical  foundations  are  weak;  that its  underlying  a*sumptions  are
of questionable  validity;  and  that it  has  not  stood  up well  to
empirical  testing. Though  caution  in  warranted  in interpreting  the
evidence  that  has accumulated  over  the  past  decade,  there  is a strong
argument  for  seeing  the  collective  model  as  setting  the  industry
standard. In  making  this  claim,  the  intention  is  not to discard  the
unitary  model.  Rather,  the  model  should  be  regarded  as a special
subset  of the  collective  approach,  suitable  when certain  specified
conditions  hold.  Equally  important,  the  indiscriminate  use  of a  model
simply  because  it is a  member  of  the collective  class  is not
advocated. Ideally,  a household  model  should  be used  only after  the
restrictions  it implies  cannot  be rejected  by the  data.  This
requirement  is not simply  an academic  nicety:  the  choice  of household
model  can  have  a  significant  impact  on policy  formulation  and
implementation.
3.  POLICY  ISSUES AND INTRANOUSINOLD  RESOURCE  ALLOCATION
A dispassionate  observer  might  wonder  if this  debate,  or  analyses
of allocation  among  household  members,  has  any relevance  outside  a
narrow  academic  framework. This  concern  is  addressed  below.
From  a policy  perspective,  the  costs  of neglecting  both  the
collective  nature  of household  decisionmaking  and  the  process  of
intrahousehold  allocation  are  often  high.  In particulart (i)
regardless  of the  model  used,  it is  incorrect  to assume  that  policies
d-eigned  to ameliorate  household  poverty  are  sufficient  for  the47
alleviation  of indiviaual  poverty,  and  that individual  poverty  can  be
alloviated  without  due regard  to household  processes;  and (ii)
*rroneoum  use  of the unitary  model  may  result  in the  nonadoption  of
beneficial  policies,  in  policies  having  unintanded  consequences,  and
in  the lose  of pollcy  handles. The next  section  explores  when and  why
it is  useful  for  policy  design  to be cognizant  of intrahousehold
inequalitles.  Then  how  the  choice  of collective  or unitary  model
affects  policy  formulation  and  success is  outlined. The  next section
summaries caveats  rogarding  collective  models  and  the implied
priorities  for futuro  policy-oriented  research. The  conclusion
follows.
POLICY  AND  IBXO  IQULXTY  PATES
Even if policymakers  were  agnostic  about  the  usefulness  of
household  models--unitary  or collective--it  is  argued  that  they
noglect  patterns  of intrahousehold  inequalities  at their  peril.
Consider  a  comon  pollcy  sLtuations  a  government  has  to target  scarce
developmental  resources.  In  many  situations,  the  focus  is  on the
poverty  of the individual,  not  the  household.  Nevertheless,  many
examples exist  when  governments  either  assume  (i)  that amelioration  of
household  poverty  is sufficient  for  the alleviation  of individual
poverty,  or (Li)  individual  poverty  can  be alleviated  without  regard
to the  actions  of other  household  members. These  assumptions  will
lead  to policy  failure,  irrespective  of the  choice  of resource
allocation  model.
Consider  a non-welfariat"  approach  to raising  the food
consumption  of undernourished  individuals  through  an in-kind  transfer
to undernourishod  households. If it is  believed  that  all resources
are  pooled  within  the  household,  the  government  will be indifferent  to
which  household  member  is  the recipient. If  the identity  of recipient
matters,  then  the  government  may  well  direct  the  transfer  to women.48
However,  whichever  allocation  scenario  in  true,  the  governm  nt needs
to target  resources  to the  miost  undernourishad  households. Haddad  and
Kanbur  (1990)  demonstrate  that  the  undernourishment  rankLngs  of
various  socioeconomic  and  geographic  household  groups  can  change  when
individual-level  food  consumption  information  is used  instead  of
household-level  information.  For  example,  although  individual-level
data  may indicate  that  individual.  from  certain  households  are an
important  food  poverty  group,  a reliance  on household-level  data  might
imply  that  they are  not  an important  group. This  result  occurs  when
patterns  of intrahousehold  inequality  differ  between  different
household  groups. If inequality  was similar  in all  groups,  food
poverty  rankings  would  be identical  whether  or not  individual-level
data  were  used to target  the  transfer.
Apps and  Savage  (1989)  draw  similar  conclusions  from  an analysis
of U.S.  data.  They show  that  welfare  orderings  of U.S.  households  are
very sensitive  to the neglect  of intrahousehold  inequality. Moreover,
the  rankings  are also  sensitive  as to how  intrahousehold  resource
allocation  is  measured. Apps and  Savage  model  demand  as allowing
transfers  between  spouses  (either  money  or household  services)  and
they report  a considerable  amount  of re-ranking  of households  (based
on individual  incomes)  as a result  of different  assumptions  about  the
magnitude  and  type  of transfer. They  conclude  that  this has important
implications  for  the  design  of a tax  and  welfare  system.
Two  other  studies  explicitly  dispel  the  notion  that the
improvement  of household  nutrition  is sufficient  for  the improvement
of preachooler  nutrition. Pelletier  et al. (1991)  test  the hypothesis
that  the  nutrition  status  of older  household  members  is strongly
reflected  in  that of young  children,  and  that associated  socioeconomic
factors  are  the same  for  both age  groups. The study  shuws  that,  in a
Malawian  sample,  the first  assumption  is  more valid  than  the second,
but  then only  during  acute  food  shortages. Work  by Senauer  and  Garcia49
in the Philippines (1993)  arrives  at  Limilar  conclusLons:  if
intrahousehold food  allocation patterns are inequtable  relatLve to
requirements, then targoting  preschoolors  based  on household-level
indicators may be a  very costly way of  raising proechooler food
intake.
Let us  turn to programs that do rely on LndLvLdual-level data for
targeting  purposes.  Often these programs confuse the need to isolate
the  individual  outcome with the  assumption  that  the  food  allocation
echanism  within  the  household  can  be  short-circuited.  suppose  there
is  concern  regarding  the  well-being  of  young  girls  Ln a  particular
rural areal  specifically,  thero  is  a  perception  that  they  do  not  get
enough food to sat.  A  pobsible  policy  response is the implementatlon
of  a  school  meals  program  in  schools  where  girls  are  recorded  as  beLng
particularly  undernourished.  However,  the  success  of  this
intervention  cannot  be  ascertained  in  the  absence  of  information  on
the  pattern  of  food  allocation  among  household  members-irrespective
of  whether  the  decLsionmaking  process  is  unltary  or  collective.
Households might  respond to  this  program by reducing  the  amount  of
food  girls receive at home (and increasing the amount of  food  consumed
by other household members).  Understanding the existing patterns of
intrahousehold allocation of food is  a  necessary  prerequisite  in
determining the  effectiveness  of such policy interventions (Haddad and
Hoddinott 1993).
POLICY  aND  MODSLING OF INT  U5Ua  XRUoLD  RSOURC  AaLLOCATXIN
Kuhn  (1970)  points  out that  while  the  Copernican  model  of  the
universe Lnitially resolved a number  of the  anomalies  that  had accrued
within the  Ptolemaic  system,  it  did  not  iaediately  offer  improved
predictive  power  over  the  often convoluted ad  hoc  extensions  of  the
older  model.  Similarly,  despite  the  accumulated  evidence  against
income  pooling,  the  unitary  model,  bolsterod  by  ad  hoc  asumptions,50
retains an impressive  ability  to explain  the new body of evidence  on
inequality  within  the houzohold. Moreover,  despite  numerous
rejectLons  of incom  pooling  and  of polar  cases  of altruism  within  a
family,  to date,  no one  model  of collective  behavior  dominates  the
alternatLves  posed.  In  other  words,  does  the analytical  complexity
asocLated with  collective  models  of household  behavior  offer  any
additional  inaLghts  for  pollcymakers?  First,  some  general
observations,  before  specLfic  areas where  the choice  of  model  is
important  are  noted.
Under  a  welfarist  approach  to poverty  alleviation,  transfers  are
more  efficient  than price  subsidies  if dcisionmaking is unitary.
Under  a  non-welfarist  scenario,  with  unitary  decisionmaking,  the
efficlency  of transfers  holds  when planners,  objectLves  (weights  on
individual  welfare)  match  with those  of the  household  (Tobin  1970),
although  Ross (1988)  illustrates  how  such  differences  of objectlves
can  make in-kind  transfers  efficient  interventions.  If the  two sets
of preferences  do not  match,  possibly  due  to some  externalities  in
investments  or because  policymakers  (or  a subset)  have  a  different
preforence  for  female  survival  than  do some  households  in the  society
at large,  then  there  are still  a range  of interventions  in wage  and
price  policy  that  may be used  in the  context  of unitary  docisionmaking
to shift  household  allocation  closer  to social  objectives.
A fair  portion  of the  literature  on gender  discrimination  in
health  and schooling  can  be viewed  in  this context. For  example,  the
findings  of Rosenzweig  and  Schultz  (1982)  imply  an impact  on female
child  survival  if crediblo  policies  can  be found  to narrow  male-female
wage  gaps.  Similarly,  Alderman  and  Cortler  (1993)  and  Alderman  at al.
(1992)  imply  roles  for  price  policy  in health  and schooling  allocation
across  boys  and  girls  without  a  noed  to shift  relative  control  of
incomo.51
If,  however,  household  allocation  in collective,  it  makes  little
sense  to discuss  a  match  between  the Dreferences  of the  planners  and
the  household. In a  technical  sense,  interventions  that  aim  to shift
budget  allocations  merely  weigh  the individuals'  utility  differently
than  does  the  household  head.  Now,  non-welfarist  objectives  can  be
achieved  by taking  advantage  of existing  gender  roles (for  instanco,
directing  transfers  to improve  household  food  security  to women).
However,  from  a  practical  standpoint,  it  may not  be useful  to focus  on
the  preference  of one  individual  for,  say,  Lnvestment  in  children;
only in rather  special  circumM.Ances  do the  preferences  of a  single
individual  determine  resource  ailocation.  Welfarist  objectives  are
more  difficult  to determine  in  the absence  of a  wstandardw  household
utility  function. Thus,  the  current  inahility  to distinguish  between
alternative  collective  models  limits  exact  measurement  of  the  welfare
effects of  policy.
However,  this  does not  prohibit  identification  of four  areas  of
policy  in  which  noglec.  of the  decisionmaking  process  could  have
serious  consequences  in  terms  of  policy  failure. The first  concerns
the  effect  of public  transfers  made  to the  household. The  unitary
model  predicts  that  the impact  of such  transfers  is unaffected  by the
identity  of the  recipient. Second,  at a - 3-,vct level,  the  unitary
model implies  that it does  not  matter  to  ,2licy  initiatives  are
directed. Given  information  sharing,  the  response  to that  policy  will
be recipient-independent.  This  gives  rise  to two  potential  policy
failures: (i)  the nonadoption  of  particular  policies;  and (ii)
unintended  costs  arising  from  policies  that are  adopted. Nonadoption
and  unintended  policy  nonsequences  through  attempts  to facilitate  the
adoption  of new technology  or of practices  to retard  environmental
degradation  are illustrated  below. Third,  the  unitary  model
diminishes  the  potential  importance  of a number  of  policy  initiatives,
such  as civil  law  and  property  rights,  which  have  long  policy  handles.52
Finally,  the  nature  of lnteractions  betw--n  household  members  will
determlne  whether  publlc  transfers  are  mLtlgated  or onhanced  by
changes  ln  prlvate  behavior.
Taroetino  of Transfer.  and  Income-Source  Deoendence
As dlicussed,  the  claim  that  household  decisions  are independent
of the identlty  of the  lndlvldual  receivlng  income  (income-source
Lndependence)  has  been  refuted  ln  a  number  of settlngs. The
Lmplications  of this  refutatlon  for  public  transfers  are  illustrated
by the followlng  quotatLon3:
Many  partLeLpants  inr  the  public  debate  concerning  actual
government  transfers take it  for granted that lntrafamily
distributLon  wlll vary *ystematlcally  with the control of
resources*  When the Brltlah chlld allowance system was
changed ln the mid-1970s  to make chlld  beneflts  payable  in
cash  to  the  mother,  lt  was  widely  regarded  as  a  redistribution
of  famLly  lncome  from  men  to  women  and  was expected  to be
popular  wlth  women  (Lundberg  and  Pollak  1992).
Indeed,  so  convlnced  dld some MinLsters  become  that  a
transfer  of  lncoe  'from  the  wallet  to  the  purse'  at  a  time  of
wage restraLnt  would  be resented  by male  workers,  that they
decided  at  one  polnt  ln 1977  to  defer  the  whole  chlld  benefit
schema  (Brown  1984,  cited  in  Lundberg  and  Pollak  1992).
Compared  to  the  creation  of  a  new  instrument  that  so  overtly
transfers  Lncome  "from  the  wallet  to  the  purse,"  other  programs  may
achieve  the  same  objective  under  a  non-welfarist  banner.  Food  stamps,
whlch  often  are  found  to lnfluence  spending  in a  manner  different  from
cash,  despLte  models  that  show  their  theoretical  equivalence  (Senauer
and  Young  1986),  may be an  illustration.  Food  stamps  are not  directed
at  women per  se,  but  because  women are  the  main  food  purchasers,  the
new  dellvery  mechanism  creates  an entitlement  to  the  transfers.
similar  conslderatlons  are  at play,  for  instance,  as to whether
labor  should  be  remunerated  with  food  or  cash  in  a  public  works
scheme. One of  the  many  factors  entering  into  the  decision  is  the
llkely  proflle  of program  participants.  When  the nature  of the  work53
and  the level  of the  wage  offered  are  such  that  many  of the
participants  are  predominantly  male,  some  have  argued  that
remuneration  should  be in  the form  of food  due  to differences  in  mile
and  female  expenditure  patterns. Evidence  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa,
Latin  America,  and  South  Asia shows  that  women  are  more likely  to
upend  their  income  (controlling  for  all  other  observable  household
characteristics)  on food,  nutrients,  and  fuel.
The importance  of the  class  of potential  policy  failurse  centered
on control  of income  is likely  to grow  as social  safety  nets  are
designed  to ameliorate  the short-run  negative  impacts  of economic
adjustment. Newman  et al. (1991)  found  that  in Bolivia,  the Social
Emergency  Fund  activities,  mainly  targeted  at the  construction
industries,  did  bolster  the  incomes  of  the poorest  in a cost-effective
manner. But  the Fund  only  had  a 2  percent  female  participation  rate.
The  untested  assumption  seems  to be that intrahousehold  income
redistribution  will ensure  that  the fund  income  will  reach  wives,
mothers,  and  children.
One important  implication  of income-source  dependence  is the
breakdown  of separability  in the  Singh,  Squire,  and  Strauss  (1986)
model  of the agricultural  household;  one  cannot  conceive  of
maximization  of the profits  of the  firm  without  addressing  individual
incomes  and  consumer  preferences. As indicated  in the  discussion  of
income  pooling,  the  relative  increase  in  various  human  and  physical
capital  investments  following  increases  in female  and  male earnings
may differ. Moreover,  there  are  apparent  inefficiencies  in input
allocation  that  may  be explained  by collective  models  of the  household
firm.  In situations  where  production  is  divided  into  individual  and
collection  production,  the implications  for  supply  response
elasticities  are  important.
An empirical  investigation  into  just  such  a situation  is found  in
Puetz (1991). For The  Gambia,  supply  elasticities  are  estimated  for54
groundnuts,  which  are  grown  through  separate  production  by
individuals,  and cereals,  which  are  grown  collectively  through  joint
production  by all  compound  members,  with  the compound  head  retaining
control  of  the  harvest  and  disposal  of  the crop. Puetz  analyzes  the
response  of  production  to  increasing  groundnut  prices. If  only
individual  plots  are  analyzed,  supply  el-t_:cities  are  low.  When
collective  plots  are included  in  the  calculation,  the  supply
elasticity  rises. ThLo  demonstrates  the importance  of examinlng  the
role  of the  wider  collection  of individuals  that  determine  the  welfare
of  each individual,  irrespective  of  whether  that  grouping  is called  a
"household"  or  a  "compound."  Pusts  notes  that  it  would  be
understandable  not  to  look  into  groundnut  supply  response  on
collective  plots,  "since  it  is  conventional  wisdom  in  The  Gambia  that
collective  production  is  mainly  geared  towards  producing  food  for  a
common  granary. The  results  of the  present  study  show  that collective
production  is  more flexible  in crop  allocation  than anticipated"  (p.
103).
On the  demand  side,  if preferences  are  not  unitary,  some
colloective  models  imply  price  elasticities  that  differ  from
conventional  demand  theory.  1
7 Most  price  policy,  hoijver,  is designed
on  the  basis  of  models  that  use a  representative  consumer  or  a few
sets  of  consumers  based  on  region  and income  to  portray  an entire
economy. In  the  presence  of  unitary  preferences,  it  is not  apparent
that  refined  estimates  of  demand  elasticitios  from  further
disaggregation  of  households  will  lead  to  new  price  instruments.
However,  if  preferences  are  not  unitary,  gender-  or  age-specific  price
indexes  exist,  and  price  movements  can reallocate  rosources  within
households. Therefore,  when  targeted  income-transfer  programs  are
costly  to administer,  price  policy  may  be more efficient  than lump-sum
transform.55
Pavina  Attention  to the Intrahousehold  Ramifications  of Policy
Initiatives  The  Efficacy  of Polices  to Encouraae  Technoloav  AdoDtion
and  the  Reduction  of Environmental  Dearadation
Tho second  type of pollcy  failure  procipitatod  by a reliance  on
the  unitary  model  results  from  the  assumption  that  it  does  not  matter
to whom  policy  initiatives  are  directed. Only in rather  special
circumstances  do  the  preferences  of  one  individual  determine  resource
allocation  for  the household. It  should  be kept  in  mind that  the
fallure  in  policymaking  to appreciate  the ramifications  of  a  policy
among  household  members  can  occur  when  that policy  is targeted  to one
household  member  by default,  or  when it is explicitly  targeted  to a
particular  household  member. In  the environmental  context,  both  the
nonadoption  of  appropriate  technology  and  negative  consequences  of
adoption  constitute  policy  failure.
There  are  a  number  of  examples  of  the  nonadoption  of  policies
designed  to  improve  crop  technology  (Quisumbing  1993).  Jones  (1986),
reported  the  results  of  a  project  in  Cameroon  to encourage  women "o
produce  rice.  In  the study  area,  rice  was considered  to be a  male
crop.  Any income  generated  from  it  would  have  been  controlled  by  men,
even  if the  crop  was  produced  by women.  Consequently,  few  women
entered  into  rice  cultivation.  Instead,  they  continued  to  grow
sorghum,  despite  its  lower  returns,  because  they  controlled  the
harvested  product. In Zambia,  households  were encouraged  to intercrop
maize,  a  male crop,  with  beans,  a women's  crop (Poats  1991).
Researchers  hoped  that  households  would  take advantage  of well-known
complementary  nutritional  benefits  of the  two  crops.  In addition,
they hoped  that  the  overall  amount  of  weeding  time  would  be
diminished,  through  the simultaneous  weeding  of both crops. However,
women opposed  this innovation  because  if  beans  were  planted  on land
normally  allocated  to  maize,  they lost  ownership  of  the  beans  and  the
men benefitted  from  the  cash  generated  by their  sales.56
That  extension  workers  routinely  ignore  women  farmers  when  new
technology  in  introduced  is  well  documented. For  example,  in  Malawi,
Gladwin  and  McMillan  (1989)  found  that  a  groundnut  seed  multiplication
project  was introduced  to male household  heads,  despite  the fact  that
groundnuts  were  recognized  as a  women's  crop  while  tobacco,  cotton,
and  hybrid  maize  were considered  men's  crops. Extension  agents  argued
that  the  program  was "too  complicated"  for  women  to understand. The
exclusion  of women from  the  project  resulted  in  a  loss  of cash  crop
income  for  the  wives  of program  participants.
However,  it is not  only  the  promulgators  of the  technology  that
ignore  women,  but also  those  who seek  to facilitate  technology
adoption  through,  for  instance,  credit  provisioning.  Again  from
Malawi,  Gladwin  and  McMillan  (1989)  found  the incorrect  perception
that  married  women  were indifferent  to the  receipt  of "farmers  club"
credit,  either  directly,  or indirectly  through  their  husbands. In
fact,  women  were "full"  club  members  because  they  did  not have  a  man
to be an intermediary-it  was  a social  stigma. Under  these
circumstances,  married  women  may indeed  prefer  the indirect  route,  but
a  first-best  solution  is  to have  a  separate  credit  club for  women
farmers.
Examples  of the  overly  narrow  policy  focus  on one  household
member  can  be found  in  the  many attempts  to introduce  new  technology
for  effective  environmental  resource  management. Garrett  and  Espinosa
(1988)  document  one such  example  from  Ecuadorean  Indian  communities.
In these  communities,  both  men and  women  traditionally  own  and control
land  and  animals,  with  control  being  governed  by a complex  set  of
property  rights  within  the family. When  an erosion  control  system  was
being  designed,  the  technicians  only  consulted  the  male  household
members.  During  the  implementation  phase,  women demonstrated  against
the  project,  and  refused  to  have  their  fields  divided  by  the  trench.57
A similar  failure  of policy  occurred  in  the context  of a
reforestation  initiative  in  the  Dominican  Republic. The initiative
was predicated  on the  assumption  that  men and  women  uced  wood for  the
same  purposes. Fortmann  and  Roch-leau  (1989)  noto  that this
reforestation  project  did  not  conside-  the  possibility  that  men's
needs  from  the forest  may  differ  from  women's  needs,  consequently  only
men were  consulted. As a result,  the intercropping  of cash and
subsistence  crops  and  tha  planting  of indigenous  and  exotic  pines  for
watershed  management  and  timber  were  emphasized.  Women were  only
consulted  during  a  midproject  evaluation  and  it  turned  out  that  their
nesds  were  not  met  by  the  project.  Women needed  trees  for  fuelwood
supplies  and  for  palm  frond  fiber  for  basket-weaving.  The  scarcity  of
fuelwood  forced  some  women to  give  up  their  cassava  bread  processing
operations  due  to time  constraints.  Since  technical  assistance  to  the
project  was  available  only  during  start-up,  women's  noeds  for
fuelwood-recognized  so late  in  the  project--could  not  be addressed.
The above  example.  embody  targeting  by default. However,
deliberate  targeting  of an initiative  does  not  necessarily  diminish
the  probability  of adverse  unintended  impacts. An example  of this in
The  Gambia  is  provided  by von  Braun  and  Webb (1989). In the  early
1980s,  rice irrigation  was introduced  to an area  of swamp  rice
production  in order  to raise  yields,  commercialize  the  product,  and
raise  women's  share  of household  income. However,  an initiative
intended  to rains  female  income  shares  ended  up reducing  them.
Previously,  women  were the  rice  growers. Yield  increases  transformed
the  status  of rice from  a  private  crop  under  the control  of women into
a communal  crop  under  the  control  of men.  The  choice  of technology
and  the  attempts  by donors  to protect  female  rights  were  based  on
observed  outcomes  of household  decLsions,  which  left  the  production  of
rice  under  the  control  of women.  However,  the  process  of
d-cisionmaking  was not fully  understood  and  rights  not sufficiently58
protected  by  project  management.  Thum,  males  in  the  cormunity  were
able  to shift  the  equilibrium  of  resource  allocation  to  reflect
preproject  preferences  and  to take  control  over  the  new  resources
offered  by the  project. It is not,  of course,  clear  that  a fuller
model  of household  resource  allocation  would  have  led  to measures  to
ensure  that  the donor's  intentions  were realized. Nevertheless,  a
perspective  that  viewed  individuals  as interdependent  (rather  than  an
independent  agents)  might  have  led  to an  expectation  of responses  by
males to changes  in  women's  assets and  productivity-it
By contrast,  a project  in  Togo  to encourage  soybean  production
succeeded  precisely  because  it  took into  account  the  collective  nature
of household  behavior  (Gibbels  and  Iddie  1986,  cited  in Dankelman  and
Davidson  1987). At the  outset,  the  project  was  targeted  to  women.
Exchange  visits  were  arranged  between  soybean  and  non-soybean  growing
villages. Workshops  were  organized  in  women's  homes  (it  was  argued
that homes  are  more  effective  training  places  than an unfamiliar  urban
center). Women  returned  to their  villages  after  these  workshops  to
train  other  women.  In  addition,  soybeans  were not  introduced  as a
cash  crop.  They  were promoted  as legumes  that  could  be used  to make
sauces. Thus,  men did  not  become  interested  in cultivating  soybeans
and  even  allowed  women  to utilize  small  plots  of land  for  soybean
cultivation.
The  nonadoption  of new  technology  in the  area  of family  planning
is another  example  of the failure  of a  deliberately  targeted
initiative  to achieve  its  stated  goals. Most fertility  research
assumes  that  the household  can  be treated  as a  unitary  decisionmaking
unit (so-called  "one-sex"  models),  even  though  married  men  and  married
women  may  have  very different  ideas  about  how  many children  they  want.
Rao and  Greene  (1991)  model  the  fertility  decision  as  a  "two-sex"
decision. They  use a  bargaining  approach  to examine  how "credible
threats"  (that  is,  the ability  to support  oneself  outside  of marriage)59
affect  fertility  decisions  and  find  that increased  female  earnings
decrease  fertillty,  while  increased  male  earnings  raise  fertillty.
They  conclude  that  men's  characteristics  must  not  be  ignored  in  the
study  of  fertility  determinants,  and  argue  that  the incom  results  are
most plausibly  explalned  in  a  bargaining  framework--women  are  less
keen  than  men  to  have additional  children.  Their  first  conclusion  is
supported  by  evaluations  of  prenatal  interventions  in  Thailand  (ICRW
1990).  Ivaluators  found  the  most successful  family  planning  centers
to  be those  that made a  point  of  seeking  male  participation  in
classes.
lanorina  the "Long  Reach*  of Policy
Perhaps  the  most underrated  drawback  of relying  on the  unltary
model  for  policy  guidance  is  that  a number  of potentially  powerful
policy  handles  are  disabled.  Under  the  unitary  model,  policymakers
affect  intrahousehold  resource  allocation  primarily  through  changes  in
prices.  Some,  but not  all,  collective  approaches  suggest  that
additional  policy  handles,  often  with a  very  long  reach,  are  available
to the  policymaker. The along  reachu  policy  handles  depend  on the
existence  of rights  that are  credible  in  the sense  that should  they  be
violated,  they  obligate  action. However,  the policy  handles  do not
dopend  on this  action  for  their  effectiveness.
To see  this,  consider  the following  mod-l  in  the context  of more
equitable  access  to common  property  resources  (CPR). Within  a
household,  there  are  two  individuals,  each with  access to  a  production
function  that  produces  output  as  the  result  of  two  task  inputs.  rhere
is  comparative  advantage  in  the  tasks,  so it pays  to cooperate  and
specialize  in tasks.  But  how are  the  gains  from  cooperation  to  be
divided? Let  the  fallback  option  for  each individual  be identified
with the  outcome  of working  alone. Now,  suppose  that the  government
introduces  a  schme  that  guarantz-z  better  access for  all  to common60
property  resourcs.  How  will this  affect  intrahousehold  inequality
and, in  particular,  the  well-being  of the  individual  with poorer  pro-
intorvention  access? If  the income  generated  from  improved  access  in
higher  than  what  the  women  could  previously  earn  on their  own,  but in
still  leca  than  the incom  from  cooperation,  even though  the  comon
property  li  not  actually  used,  more  equitable  access  actually  improves
Lntrahousehold  equality. What La  remarkable  li  that  the scheme  has  a
long  reach-lt eualizes lntrahousehold  allocation  by altering  outside
optlons,  desplte  those  optlons  not  being  taken  up (Haddad  and  Kanbur
1992b).
Of  course,  the credlbillty  of the  guarantoed  access  is at the
heart  of the  matter. If  rationing  limLts  the ablilty  of  women to
raise  their  fellback  utillty,  then  there  will  not  be  an  impact  on
intrahousehold  allocatLon. Other  lntrahousehold  allocatlon  issues
also come into  play-if  Lmproved  access  is  only  guaranteed  for  marrled
womn,  the  threat  polnts  outslde  the  marriage  are  unaffected  by  the
policy  cholce.  Improved  access  to  CPRz for  women outslde  as  well as
insLde  marrLage  wlll  result  ln CPR reforms  that  are  better  able  to
alter  lntrahousehold  resource  allocation.
Slmilarly,  programs  that raLse  the  equality  of access  to credit,
even  lf the  credit  is  not  utilized,  may affect  Lntrahousehold  resource
allocatlon. There  are  a number  of successful  programs  that allow
women,  for  example,  to enter  into  agreements  as individuals  rather
than  as wlves (often  on the  basis  of shared  liabllity  with other
women,  as  in  the  Grame-n  Bank  program  ln Bangladesh). Thli,  then,  can
be  viewed  as  a  subset  of  the  category  of  creating  property  rLghts.
More  generally,  many collectlve  models  imply  that  changes  in  the
legal  *nvlronment  have  an lndlrect  lmpact  on  famlly  allocatlon  through
changes  in  relatlve  bargaLnLng  position  as well  as the  direct  lmpact
when the  laws  are  applled. Thus,  Folbre  (1993)  calls  for  a  review  of
gender  bLas ln law  as a foundatlon  for  social  pollcy.  Similarly,  she
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points  out  pervasive  biases  in divorce  and  child  support  laws  that
cause  intrafamily  and  intragenerational  inoquality.
In  many societies,  there  is a particular  need  for  property  rights
that  allow  women  to hold  assets  as individuals  rather  than  as  wives
and  trustees  for  minor  children. For  instance,  women  may be unable  to
utilize  environmentally  sound  technologies  due  to an insecurity  of
land  tenure,  the  absence  of rights  to grow  trees,  and  an inability  to
initiate  land improvements  without  the  permission  of the  male head  of
the clan (PAO  1991t  Bruce  1989).
While  concluding,  along  with  others,  that  such  legislative
reforms  can  have  far-reaching  effects  on the  welfare  of children  and
adult  women,  Folbre  also  acknowledges  that such  biases  in civil  law
often  reflect  preexisting  biases  in common  law  and  religious
strictures. Sen (1990)  takes  this  observation  one stop  further.
Often  the legal  and  social  inequalities  reflect  perceived  legitimacy
as seen  by women  as well  as  men.  This,  in  turn,  parallels  perceptions
of relative  contributions  to the  household  in  which  cash  earnings  are
valued  more  than unpaid  labor. Women  often  do not  see  themselves
"entitled"  to  a  larger  share  of  household  resources.  This,  in  turn,
leads  to inequalities  in investments  in physical  and  human  capital  and
a  feedback  cycle  that  reinforces  inequalities  that is  difficult  to
break.
This  implies,  firstly,  that  legislative  solutions  to
intrahousehold  inequalities  need  to overcome  the  biases  of  male
policymakers. Moveover,  it indicates  that  were a coalition  of
advocates  of increased  rights  for  women  and  children  able  to achieve  a
success  in  civil  law,  enforcement  of those  laws  is likely  to be
problematic. Thus,  while  "getting  the legal  environment  right"  may  be
a cornerstone  in a program  to achieve  greater  intrahousehold  equality,
measures  that change  incentives  and  that  chango  perceptions  of62
entitlments might  be necessary  to achieve  the full  potential  of such
legal  reforms.
For example,  a  set  of polices  to improve  access  to schooling  for
girls  should  understand  the  nature  of demand  for  such services.  The
existence  of social  biases  should  not  necessarily  be used  as an excuse
to do nothing. However,  policy  should  be sensitive  as to whether
mothers  and  fathers  feel  girls  are "entitled"  to as  much schooling  as
boys.  Policies  that attempt  to shift  the  supply  of services  from  boys
to  girls  should  be aware  that current  p rceptions,  however  malleable
over  time,  may  slow  down  the  attainment  of policy  goals.
So far,  this  discussion  of "long-reach"  policies  has  relied  upon
Meclroy's  extra  environmental  parameters  or LLPs,  a feature  of Nash-
bargained  collective  models. However,  the  qualitative  implications  of
the  various  alternative  collective  models  are  not  sufficiently
similar,  and  those  who  point  out  the limitations  of the  unitary  model
for  policy  analysis  must be judicious  in  their  championing  of
collective  models. For  example,  the  most general  form  of the sharing
rule  in Bourguignon  et al. (1992a)  does  not  have  the "long-reach"
implication,  although  sharing  rules  that are  Nash-bargained  can  be
considered. It should  also  be remembered  that  Nash  cooperative
bargaining  models  may indicate  no effect  if a  policy  changes  the
distribution  of transfers  within  a union  but  has  no effect  on the
threat  point. An illustration  of such  a policy  is  a  shift  in the
distribution  of child  support  supplements  from fathers  to mothers,  but
leaving  intact  the  distribution  of support  payments  to mothers  in the
event  of a  divorce (Lundberg  and  Pollak  1992).
Intrahousehold  Altruism  and  the  Offuottino  o. Policy  Goals
It  was noted  that  changes  in  private  behavior  may  offset  public
transfers. In r,dels  much  as  Barro (1974),  altruism  on the  part of
private  agents  undoes  the  effect  of government  policies  that increase63
the incomes  of  the  current  generation  at  the expense  of  future
generations. If  intergenerational  altruism,  one  form  of  the  unitary
model,  is  replaced  with  exchange  motives,  this  result  no  longer  holds.
In a  developing  country  context,  the  followilig  example  (adapted  from
Cox  and  Jimenez  1990)  illustrates  this feature. Consider  a
hypothetical  family  with  young  members  residing  in towns  and  old
members  living  in  rural  areas. Transfers  are  made  by  the altruist
"young*  to  the  old,  and  individual  consumption  in  a  function  of
aggregate  income.  Suppose  a  social  security  program  is  introduced
that  taxes  the  young  and  subsidizes  the  old,  leaving  aggregate  income
unchanged. This  might  well lead  to  a  reduction  in  urban-rural
remittances,  with  consumption  by individual  members  unchanged.
However,  suppose  that  these  young-to-old  transfers  are  undertaken  in
exchange  for  some in-kind  service  (such  as looking  after  cattle). The
transfer  would  be an amount  equal  to what  the recipient  would  have
received  working  as a casual  laborer. Now  the social  security  prog_.am
uses  urban  wage taxes  to  subsidize  rural  wages. As a result,  the
urban  household  members  must transfer  higher  amounts  to their  elders,
because  the  opportunity  cost  of looking  after  the cattle  has
Lncreased.  This  is the  opposite  result  of that  predicted  by the
altruistic  unitary  model.
The  empirical  work  of Altonji,  Hayashi,  and  Kotlikoff  (1992)  as
well as  Cox and  Jimenez  (1992)  has  been  motivated,  in  part,  by a
desire  to test  the policy  implications  of such  a  model  of
intergenerational  altruism. An analogous  possibility  exists  for
intrahousehold  transfers  from  husbands  to  wives.  While  the  polar
position  of perfect  altruism  may  be hard  to  defend,  the  degree  of
partial  crowding  out is  not  measured  in  most  models. This,  again,
makes  assessment  of the impact  of targeted  transfers  imprecise-l
Consecuences  of  False  Relectlion  of  the  Unitary  and  Collective  Modelz64
In conclusion,  can  it  be argued  that  under  many  circumstances,
acceptance  of  a  unitary  model  of the  household,  when it iu
inappropriate,  has  more serious  consequences  for  policy  than  the false
rejection  of such  a  model?  In the  context  of the  policy  failures  just
outlined,  a  cautious yes"  is argued  for.
In  the  area  of  targeted  interventions,  consider  the  targeting  of
re-ources  to women.  False  rejection  of  the collective  model  implies
(erroneously)  that  targeting  resources  to women  is  pointless;  thus,  an
efficient  means  of directing  resources  to women  and  children  is
foregone. False  rejection  of  the  unitary  model  implies  that the  costs
of  targeting  could  have  been  avoided. Even  if there  is a wide
confidence  interval  on  the differences  entailed  by  collective  models,
most  imply  either  more,  or  at  least  no less,  investment  in children
from  increasing  resources  controlled  by  women  than  the  unitary
model.m Thus,  unless  there  are  significantly  higher  costs  to
targeting  programs  to  women  in poor  households,  rather  than to  poor
households  as a unit,  the available  evidence  may be considered
adequate  to indicate  that false  rejection  of  the collective  model  is
the  more  serious  error. An exception,  however,  might  occur  if,  in
addition  to  different  rates  of  investment  in  children,  males  and
females  have  different  gender  biases  in  there  investments  (Thomas
1991).  In  such  a  circumstance,  a  targeting  of  transfers  may  leave
some children  worse  off.
Moreover,  few  programs  that  target  women  are  costless. For
example,  they  may impose  extra  time  burdens  or.  women,  reducing  the
welfare  of the  woman  herself  and,  possibly,  her children. While  most
studies  indicate  that increased  earnings  for  women  offset  any  negative
effects  of reduced  time for  child  care-an important  factor  in the
production  of nutrition  and health  (Leslie  19P8)-the studies
generally  do not  analyze  the impact  of an increased  time  burden  that
shifts  rather  than increases  total  household  resources. Given  that65
similar  examples  of costs  to participation  in  programs  are  indicated
in  the literature  on  targeting,  greater  precision  in  measuring  the
benefits  to intrahousehold  targoting  may  be nececsary  to determine
optimal  program  design.
Regarding  nonadoption  of  development  initiatives,  the
consequences  of  the false  rejection  of  the  collective  model  in  terms
of nonadoption  or adoption  with unintended  effects  has  been  noted.
False  rejection  of the  unitary  model  again  implies  that  the  costs  of
understanding  the  needs  and constralnts  of all  household  members  could
have  been avoided.
For  long-reach  pollcy  handles,  false  rojectLon  of the collective
model  elLmLnates  many pollcy  lnstruments  that  could  have far-reachlng
and  profound  effects  on the  llves  of the  most  vulnerable  of household
mmbers.  False  rojectlon  of the  unltary  model  means  that  these  long
handles  are  not connected  to the  policy  machine,  and  energy  wlll  be
wasted  ln  pulllng  on  them.  For  vhe  lntergeneratlonal  pollcy  example,
false  rojectLon  of  the  collectlve  model  lmplles  that  the  effect  of the
tax policy  is  the  opposLte  of its  lntent: Lnstead  of  reduclng  urban-
to-rural  remittance  flows,  the  urban  sage  tax-rural  wage  subsldy  has
increased  urban-to-rural  remlttance  flows.  A false  rejectLon  of  the
unltary  model  wlll  again  lead  to  impact  belng  the  opposlte  of lntent,
although  the  relative  magnLtudes  of each  false  rejectlon  is hard  to
predict.
CAV3afs  OF  THU COLLECTIVE MODZL  AND POLICY  REsEARCH PRIORITIXS
It  was noted  that  although  the  collective  approach  to
Lntrahousehold  decisionmakLng  is  more  plausLble  on  theoretlcal  and
emplrlcal  grounds  than  the  unitary  model,  a  large  number  of
researchable  issu  a remaln  that  are  relevant  for  pollcy. Collectlve
models  of household  behavlor  have  four  strengths: they address  the
Lisue  of  preference  aggregation;  they  have  emplrlcally  dLitLnguLshable66
predictions;  they highlight  important  policy  considerations;  and  they
are supported  by a diverse  set  of empirical  teste. However,  there  are
several  caveats  worth  noting  that  lead  to the  policy  research
priorities  discuscid  in this  section.
First,  caution  is  required  in interpreting  a number  of results
supporting  collective  models  of household  behavior. As discussed,  it
is difficult  to separate  the  effects  of individual  preferences  from
t*  kt  of differences  in  *ndowments  and  productivity.  Thus,  tests  of
differences  ln  behavior  may  be biased  by heterogeneity.  Further  work
on collective  approaches  is  necessary  to improve  their  prdilctive
power  and  enhance  their  usefulness  for  public  policy.
Second,  the coWparative  statics  of most collective  models  take
the  operations  of the  marriage  market  as oxogenously  determined.
Relaxing  this  assumption  alters  the  impact  of  policy  changes  on
household  behavior.  Lundberg  and  Pollak  (1992)  consider  the  effect  of
payment  of child  allowances  to  women.  Using  a  cooperative  model,  they
show  that  such  a  scheme  will  initially  improve  the intrahoucshold
distribution  of  resources  in  favor  of  women.  But  suppose  that
household  formation  is  preceded  by some form  of binding  agreement
(such  as a  prenuptial  contract)  that includes  the  promise  of transfers
from  husband  to wife.  Once the  new  child  allowance  scheme  is in
place,  one  might  expect  that  husbands  would  reduce  their  transfers.
As Lundberg  and  Pollak  (1992,  21)  note,
with  binding  transfers,  the  distributional  effect  of  a  policy
changing  the recipient  of child  allowances  will,  therefore,
persist  only  within  marriages  in  existence  at the  time  of  the
policy change.  For subsequent  generations  of marriages,
adjustments  in prenuptlal  transfers  will exactly  offset  the
shift  in child  allowances.
Finally,  Son (1985)  notes  that  bargaining  amongst  members  in  also
a  function  of their  oerceived  contribution  to the  househnld. The
individual  percei-:'c  naking  the  larger  contribution  can  expect  to67
obtain  an  outcome  more favorable  to  him  or  her.  This  may  place  womn
at a  particular  disadvantage,  as  much  of their  contribution  may take
the  form  of  nonmarket  labor,  which  is Less  vistble  than  wage
employment. The  distinction  between  actual  and  perceived  behavior  in
rarely  made in collectlve  models  of household  behavior. Woolley
(1992)  is  a recent  exception.
Policy  research  prioritLes  follow  from  these  caveats.
Inecrooratina  Dvnamic  Cultural  Proces-es
A number  of the  key  studies  on intrahousehold  allocation
recognize  a  dynamic  cultural  process. For  example,  Folbre  (1993)
implies  that  public  policy  is not  separate  frow  inequalities  in  the
household;  policy  can  eisily  be  shown  to  cause  that  inequality,  but  is
also  a reflection  of the attitudes  that  determine  household
allocation. In another  context,  Sen (1990)  sees  a  second  feedback
loop  in  which  perceptions  of self  and  personal  welfare  are  both causes
and  results  of inequalitieu.
Understanding  the first  loop  may allow  one  to determine  at which
points  the  system  is  most  subject  to intervention  and  at which  points
economic  and  legal  reforms  can  work  in synergism. From  tha  standpoint
of research,  these  interactions  imply  a  broader  sot  of tools  than
often  used  by a single  disciplLne.  Gonerally,  the  very  nature  of
intrahousehold  research-being so rooted  in cultural  concepts  of
division  of  labor,  attitudes  towards  status  within  households,  and
perceived  versus  actual  contributions-would  seem to benefit  from  a
multidisciplinary  approach. Promising  areas  for  such  work include  (i)
the  use  of information  collected  in a qualitative  manner  and  yet
accessible  to mquantifierm,w  such  as  the  creation  of  variables  for
"respect,"  ustatus,m  or "apparent  prosperity,"  and (ii)  an
investigation  of the  cultural  norms  that  often  override  the intent  of68
social  legislation.  This,  then,  links  with  the second  feedback  loop
depicted  by Sen.
Sen's  (1990)  dlicussion  of perceived  interests  and  perceivod
legitimacy  raises  a  number  of  ethical  issues  that  can  only  be  alluded
to  here.  It  can  be presumed  that  many  pollcy  makors  are  comfortable
with the  advocacy  of  individual  rights  (usually  of  children  or
exploited  women)  implied  in  most policy  prescriptions.  However,  in
mom  cases,  social  policy  attempts  to promote  rights  that  individuals
do not currently  soo  as legitimately  theirs,  although  they-or their
daughters-may do so once  the feedback  cycle  is  reversed. With sense
of self,  and intrahousohold  allocation  ondogenous  over  the long  run,
there  is a clear  conceptual  distinction  between  dynamic  welfare
consideration  as opposed  to  paternalim.  However,  the  measurement  of
the  effect  of  interventions  in  such  a context  may require  new  research
tools.
Understandina  the  Links  Between  Intrahousehold  Resource  Allocation  and
Household  Formation  and  DI iolution
Researchers  on household  resource  allocation  are  only beginning
to explore  the links  between  models  of household  formation  or
dissolution  and  current  allocation. This,  then,  points  to another
dynamic  aspect  of intrahousehold  allocation  procesb-.  Current
allocation  may reflect  implicit  agreements  made  at the  time a union
was formed,  subject  to now  information  (including  unanticipated  income
and  fertility  shocks). Moreover,  the  process  of living  in a  union
reduces  asyumetries  of lnformation  as  well as creates  human  and
ptysical  capital  specific  to  the  partuership. Furthermore,  tne  time
path  of  transfers  and  services  often  creates  incentives  to  renege  on
agre  em  nts--a  classic  example  being  a spouse  abandoned  after  having
invested  in  the human  capital  of  the  other.  While  there  have  boen  a
number  of theoretical  and  empirical  advances  regarding  the dynamic69
process  of such  agreements  and  incentives  to renegotiate,  the  topic
remains  a priority  both for  intra-  and  LntergeneratLonal  agreements.
Th-  Need for  a Life-Cycle  PersoectLve
One  addltlonal  dynamLc  process  needs  to be addressed.  The
empirlcal  lLterature  has  utillzed  nonlabor  income  to test allocative
processes,  although  such  Lncome  often  reflects  past Lnvestments  or
labor  force  declilons. Thus,  som  econometrlc  lnnovatlons,  lncluding
application  of  panel  approaches,  may be regulred  to identlfy  the
potential  effects  of transfers  or  other  feasible  pollcy  measures  on
household  allocatlon. 8imilarly,  a  well-deslgned  experiment  that
studLes  the  effect  of randomized  targeting  of transfers  could,  in
principle,  provide  greater  precision  to some  of the  estimates  of
intrafamLly  response  than  currently  available. Valuable  (and  uostly)
as  such  a  study  may  be,  lt  will  measure  the  response  of  a  household  to
a  short-term  interventlon  (similar  to  many  government  programs)  but
will  not  necessarlly  lndlcate  how  indLvLdual  posltLons  change  when
entltlements  are  percelved  to  shlft  permanently.
The  addltlonal  data  requlrements  for  such  research  are
considerable.  Many  models  can  only  be  tested  wlth  data  dLiaggregated
by indlvidual. Furthermore,  the ideal  data set  includes  enough
informatLon  to dlstLnguLsh  life-cycle  allocatlons  from  gender-  and
endowment-sp  ciflc  patterns  and  has  data  on LnherLtance  and  dowries.
Clearly,  the  process  of collecting  such  lncome,  consumption,  and
actlvity  data  on an lndlvidual  basis  poses  a time  burden  on  the
household. Such  data  collection  often  ls  more LntrusLve  than  other
forms  of household  data  collection,  *ince  it  may  be strateglc  for
lndlviduals  not  to reveal  all  thelr  lncome.  Moreover,  one  often
requires  data  on  incomes  and  assets  of  family  members  who  are  not
coresident  as  well  as  transfers  to  and  from  these  lndlvlduals.
Indeed,  sibling  models  are  a  maln  means  of  toeting  some  of  the70
intergenerational  models  mentioned  above. For  more  on the  data
collection  implications  of intrahousehold  ronaarch,  see  Levin,
Ralston,  and  Haddad (1993).
The  Role  of Oualitative  and  Participatorv  Data  Collection
Mmtbodoloai-
Minimizing  the costs  of falcs  rejection  of the  unitary  model  is
related  to a  better  understanding  of the  policymaking  process  and  more
cost-effective  collection  of data  that  takes  a  wide-angle  view  of
housohold  int-rdependencies.  One  potential  means  of simultaneously
reducing  the costs  of collection  and  obtaining  a holistic  picture  of
household,  family,  and  community  operations  is  through  Participatory
Rural  Appraisal  (PRA)  techniques. Although  untested  via-&-vLi  other
data collectlon  methods,  these  qualitative  tochniques  are increasingly
mentioned  as a  way of complementing  the  blunter,  if  more  measured,
quantitative  survey  approaches. The  essence  of PRA is subject
participation  in the identification  of either  problems  or solutions.
PRA  techniques  are  potentially  useful  for  emphasizing  the  point  that
Lntrahousehold  resource  allocatlon  does  not  simply  mean an increased
focus  on the individual  per  so,  but  also  on the  patterns  of
relationships  that individuals  forge  with others  not  necessarily  from
their  own  household  or family,  patterns  that  are  relevant  ln
determining  the resource  flow  of interest.
Collective  Models  of Production
In general,  the relevance  of research  on intrahousehold  Lisues
would  be enhanced  by identlfying  whether  or not  the  household
represents  the relevant  group  of decilsionmakers.  There  li  a  noed for
policy  to look  beyond  households  towards  other  institutLons,  such  as
the family,  community,  and  other  social  groupings. The poverty  of
chlldren  is  possibly  less  determlned  by household  structures  than  by71
the  degree  to which  fathers-regardless  of marital  or residential
arrangments-contributo economically  to  children.  However,  while
there  is  a  large  body of evidence  that  indicates  differential  access
to household  physical  capital  and  different  input  use  by gendor (Day,
19931  Saito  1992),  there  has  not  yet  been  a systematic  attempt  to use
insights  from  intrahousehold  models  to  explain  these  patterns.
Similarly,  although  projects  havo  been  shown  to fail  due  to  imperfoct
flow  of information  between  household  members,  lose  attention  has  been
given  to  putting  tsese  observations  into  a model of  a  firm  than  has
been  given,  to  date,  to  intrafamily  consumer  allocation. The  work by
Puetz  (1992)  is  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  but  there  is  much more
work  to  be  done  on  this  issue.
COU".USZO
The  policy  failures  associated  with  accepting  unitary  models
when they  are  inappropriate  are  more  serious  than  erroneously
accepting  collective  models.  In  making  this claim,  the  approach  has
been  illustrative  rather  than  exhaustive. In  writing  this  review,  the
authors  are  conscious  of having  produced  more  questions  than  answers.
This is regarded  as an entirely  positive  outcome. Just  over a decade
ago,  a  conference  on  intrahousehold  resource  allocation  (subsequently
published  in Schlossman  and  Rogers  1988)  focused  on whether  going
inside  the  black  box"  of the  household  would  yield  any  useful
Lnsights. As the literature  reviewed  here  demonstrates,  the  answer  to
this question  is an emphatic  "yes."
Unfortunately,  the  majority  of gender  and intrahousehold-
disaggregated  analyses  of development  policy  issues  have yet  to lead
to a  consensus  beyond  this "yes."  There  are  at least  three  reasons
for  thist  (i)  by their  nature,  the results  of gender  and
lntrahousehold  analyses  are  specific  to cultures  and  are  difficult  to
generalizes  (ii)  there  is confusion  over  which  conceptual  model  of the72
houxehald  to  use,  both  across  and  within  social  science  disciplinest
and  (iii)  the collection  of many intrahousehold  data sets  is not
driven  by policy  questions.
Thus,  the  now challenge  is  to  produce  generalizable  results  that
ar-  useful  for  policy  formulation. In  this  regard,  it  would  seem
desirable  to apply  a  common  conceptual  approach  to the analysis  of a
number  of  policy-oriented  case  studies  from  a regionally  diverse  met
of  countries. Hypotheses  related  to  theme  studies  could  be developed
and  tested  with  and  without  the  benefit  of  intrahousehold  information
in  order  to  carefully  measure  the  trade-offs  between  the additional
project/policy  insights  derived  (and  the  mistakes  avoided)  and  the
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1.  Models  used  for  examining  how  resources  are allocated  among  a
group  of individuals  are  most  usefully  employed  if they  can  be applied
to that  group  of individuals  that  exhibits  the greatest  social  and
economic  interdependence.  This  group  of individuals  can  be
characterized  in a number  of ways:  coresident,  eating  from  a common
'pot,"  and  blood  relatives,  to  name  but  throe.  Of eual importance  to
the  usefuln4ss  of  intrahousehold  models  is  nsom  knowledge  of  how the
group  of  individuals  came  together  in  the first  place.
2.  This  figure  is  based  on  Marjorie  McElroy  (1993).
3.  Som  noncooperative,  collective  model--under  certain
conditlons--rule  thLs  out,  but  none  so  completely  as the  unitary
model.
4.  It is  also  possible  to  model  divorce  as the  outcome  of  a dynamic
process  within  the  household.  In  Paterson's  (1985)  model  of  marital
dissolution  in  Yoruba  households,  husbands  enter into  a contract  with
their  wives,  whereby  their  wives supply  labor  services  in  return  for
peymnt.  However,  wives use  some of  this  payment  as  a  means of
accumulating  capital,  and  once  a  certain  amount  is  obtained,  women  may
divorce  their  husbands  and  establish  the_selves  as  independent  traders.
5.  If separability  does not hold, the distinction  between  the
unitary  and  collective  models  becomes  more important.
6. Pollak  (1985)  dia-unses  some  of  these  lssues  more formally.
7  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  noncooperative  models  can
also,  under  certain  conditions,  be  Pareto  optimal  (Flgure  1.1).
8.  Manner  and  Brown  (1980)  add  an  effLeiency  parameter  to  these
utlilty  functions,  capturing  the  idea  that  living  together  might
generate  some intangible  benefit  or  cost  that  enhances or  reducoe  the
utllity  associated  wlth  che  consumptLon  of  goods.
9.  For  example,  Horney  and McElroy  (1988)  (cooperative);  Ashworth
and  Ulph  (1981),  Kooreman and  Kaptoyn  (1990)  (noncooperative);  and88
Apps (1982),  Apps and  Roes (1988),  and  Chiappori  (1988b)  (Pareto
efficient).
10.  See, for  instance,  Kumar  (1979),  Tripp (1981),  Pahl (1983),
and  Engle (forthcoming),  am  well as the  studies  cited  in  Dwyer  and
Bruce (1988),  Bruce (1989),  and  the special  issues  of Developusfnt  and
Change  (1987)  and  World  Development  (1989).
11.  Horney  and  Hc3lroy  attribute  the  woakness  of their  results  to
difficulties  in obtaini$n  complete  information  on rights  to unearned
income  within  the houmehold.
12.  This approach  is called  outlay  equivalent  analysis  and  was
first  developed  by Deaton  (1989). In  that study,  the  outlay
equivalent  technique  was  applied  to one  year (1985/86)  of data from
C8te d'Ivoire. Haddad  and  Hoddinott  (1992)  repeated  this exercise  for
the following  year  of data,  and  Haddad  and  Reardon  (1993)
dimaggregated  the approach  for  urban  and  rural  Burkina  Faso.  None of
the  three  sets  of results  find  compelling  evidence  of a pro-male  or
pro-female  bias in  the allocation  of household  resources. Yet, a
similar  outlay  equivalent  analysis  in India  (Subramanian  and  Deaton
1990)  did find  parental  expenditures  skewed  towards  boys.
13.  See  Levinson  (1989)  and  Heine (1992). Harrims  (1989)  raises
this issue  in  the context  of differential  female  mortality  in India.
14.  However,  Tauchen,  Witte,  and  Long  find  that in  upper-income
households.  where  the  wife in  the  dominant  wage earner,  further
increases  in  her income  is correlatod  with  higher  domestic  violence.
Their  model  predicts  the  opposite  result,  though  the result  is
consistent  with studies  by other  researchers  that find  greater
violence  in  households  where  men  are  at a  relative  disadvantage  to
their  spouses.
15.  Even  theme  have  been challenged  as unlikely  to provide
unbiased  instruments  on the  grounds  of intergenerational  links  of
unobserved  *roductivities.89
16.  A welfarit approach  to  poverty  assumac  that  the  level  of
incom  indicates  the  welfare  of the  unit in  question  (household  or
individual)  regardless  of  how  the  unit  chooses  to  spend  the income.  A
non-welfariut  approach  focuses  on  the  consumption  of  one  or more  goods
or  services  without  direct  invocation  of  the  household's  own
assessment  of  the  utility  of  consuming  that  good  or  service.
17.  For  example,  Nash-bargaining  models  imply  a different  set  of
restrictions  on  the  8lutsky  matrix  than  standard  models.
18.  It is  also not  clear  that any  current  model  of  bargaining  or
sharing  would  have  predicted  the  virtual  ssiauro  of  control  that
occurred.  Nevertheless,  the  example  suggestm  that  in  economics  as  in
chemistry,  a disturbance  of  an  equilibrium  leads  to  processes  that
tend  to  restore  the equilibrium.
19.  Similarly,  while  there  is  evidence  that  women's  limited
access  to  credit  affocts  the  allocation  of  inputs  to  agriculture,
given  that  in  some communities  men  purchase  a  portion  of  inputs  used
by  women,  the  not impact  of  targeted  credit  for  crops  controlled  by
womn  is  likely  to  be less  than  expected,  due  to  reallocation  by
males.
20.  Conversely,  it  may  be  possible  to conceive  of cases  in  which
an  increase  in  resources  controlled  by maloe  has  a  negative  impact  on
investments  in  children  due  to changes  in  bargaininq  or sharing  rules
that offset  the  male's  (presumed)  non-negative  marginal  propensity  to
invest. This has  been  alleged  in  regards  to  increases  in  incomes  fro
cash cropping. However,  these  scenarios  also generally  presum a
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